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Abstract
Background: A taxonomy of the objects of study, theory, assessment, and intervention is critical to the development
of all clinical sciences. Clinical psychology has been conceptually and administratively dominated by the taxonomy of
an adjacent discipline – psychiatry’s Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM). Many have called for a
‘paradigm shift’ away from a medical nosology of diseases toward clinical psychology’s own taxonomy of clinical
psychological problems (CPPs), without being able to specify what is to be listed and classified.
Main text: An examination of DSM’s problems for clinical psychology, especially its lack of clinical utility, and a search
for the essence of CPPs in what clinical psychologists actually do, leads to the proposal that: The critical psychological-
level phenomenon underlying CPPs is the occurrence of ‘problem-maintaining circles’ (PMCs) of causally related
cognitions, emotions, behaviours, and/or stimuli. This concept provides an empirically-derived, theory-based,
treatment-relevant, categorical, essentialist, parsimonious, and nonstigmatizing definition of CPPs. It distinguishes
psychological problems in which PMCs have not (yet?) formed, and which may respond to ‘counseling’, clinical
psychological problems in which active PMCs require clinical intervention, and psychopathological problems which are
unlikely to be ‘cured’ by PMC-breaking alone.
Conclusion: A subsequent classification and coding system of PMCs is proposed, and expected benefits to research,
communication, and the quality of case formulation in clinical psychology are described, reliant upon a development
effort of some meaningful fraction of that which has been devoted to the DSM.
Keywords: Case formulation, Clinical psychological problems, Functional analysis, Mental disorders, Symptom
networks, Problem-maintaining circles, Taxonomy, Transdiagnostic
The need for a new conception of clinical
psychological problems
The focus, advancement, and direction of any scientific
discipline is critically and essentially dependent upon the
basic conceptualization that it holds of its subject matter
[1–3], and upon the subsequent taxonomy or listing
which it develops of that subject matter [4, 5]. Chemistry
has its periodic table. Zoology and botany list and
categorize species. Astronomy has developed its star
charts, galaxy taxonomy, and so forth.
In order to avoid unwarranted assumptions, the ob-
jects of systematic observation and experiment, theory
development, assessment, and intervention within the
science and practice of clinical psychology – it being
a remedial discipline – may most simply be called
clinical psychological problems (CPPs). CPPs have,
over time, variously been conceived as instances of
demonic possession [6], moral failings [7], deeply-
rooted psychodynamic pathologies, observable pat-
terns of maladaptive behaviour, or internal states fun-
damentally grounded in biology [8]. Each alternative
conceptualisation has entailed its own ad hoc or sys-
tematised taxonomy of psychological-level problems.
Since the publication of the third edition of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM) [9] –
the first edition to be based heavily on a medical
model of ‘mental disorders’ (closely paralleled by the
WHO’s International Classification of Diseases) – the
conception of CPPs as biologically-based internal
states has come to dominate, and the DSM has be-
come clinical psychology’s de facto problem
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taxonomy. This has led to and cemented the assump-
tion that CPPs are solely and entirely mental disor-
ders. This assumption has resulted in many widely
recognised and irreconcilable problems for the discip-
line and profession of clinical psychology.
(The soon to be implemented latest iteration of
WHO’s ICD classification – ICD-11 – acknowledges
these problems more than DSM-5 does, and its response
will be described shortly.)
The publication of the latest edition of this taxonomy,
DSM-5 [10], has solved none of the problems alluded to
[11–16], prompting the British Psychological Society’s
Division of Clinical Psychology to release a consensus
statement on psychiatric diagnosis – Position Statement
on the Classification of Behaviour and Experience in Re-
lation to Functional Psychiatric Diagnoses: Time for a
Paradigm Shift [17] – which summarized DSM’s limita-
tions and deficiencies for clinical psychology. It con-
cluded that “the current classification system as outlined
in DSM…has significant conceptual and empirical limi-
tations, consequently there is a need for a paradigm shift
in relation to the experiences that these diagnoses refer
to, towards a conceptual system which is no longer
based on a ‘disease’ model” (p.1).
However, beyond suggesting that “such an approach
would need to be multifactorial, to contextualise dis-
tress and behaviour, and to acknowledge the complex-
ity of the interactions involved” (p.3), and that it
should be “in keeping with the core principles of for-
mulation in clinical psychology” [17], the Division did
not propose a precise focus or the content of such an
alternative conceptual taxonomy that would satisfy this
paradigm shift. It is insufficient to point up the limita-
tions of a conceptual model of CPPs if a superior one
cannot be proffered, and “at present there is no con-
sensus on what an alternative, universal theory of what
maintains and exacerbates psychological distress might
look like” [44].
If we are to develop such a radical reconceptualization
of CPPs, to foster “a true ‘Kuhnian’ revolution” ([18]
p.1935) in clinical psychology, and to develop a subse-
quent taxonomy of such, then the nature and essence of
these new CPPs may be discernible in two ways: (1) The
precise nature of the recognised inadequacies and in-
compatibilities of the mental disorder model for clinical
psychology can point us toward a more useful and rele-
vant conceptualization of CPPs; And (2) what clinical
psychologists actually address in their research and
practice may be drawn and distilled to extract the true
essence of CPPs.
So firstly, what can the problems and incompatibili-
ties for clinical psychology of psychiatry’s DSM and its
‘mental disorders’ model teach us about the essence of
CPPs?
Psychiatry is more biological-level; clinical psychology is
more psychological-level
Psychiatry, as a branch of medicine, has a much greater
focus on biological-level assessment, explanation, and
intervention than has clinical psychology. Hence, its
DSM lists.
‘mental disorders’, ‘diagnosed’ by the identification of a
‘syndrome’ of ‘symptoms’, which are assumed to be man-
ifestations of a ‘pathological condition’ [19, 20].
This ‘nosology of diseases’ [21] based not on empirical
evidence, but on clinical authority and historical
tradition [22], has been problematic for psychiatry itself
[13, 23–26], let alone for clinical psychology. It has been
plagued by such major problems as excessive rates of co-
morbidity [27, 28], which may be an indicator of arbi-
trary boundaries between its disorders [29, 30], by the
broad heterogeneity within its diagnosed groups [21,
31–33], and by the fact that none of the putative under-
lying disease processes have been uncovered in the 35
years of research since DSM-III was published [25, 34–
37]. The search for biological etiology has greatly disap-
pointed [38, 39], suggesting that psychiatric diagnosis
has oversimplified psychopathology [40].
DSM and the ICD, meantime, have been poor guides
to even psychopharmacological treatment selection [41,
42], let alone to psychological therapy selection. Psychi-
atric drugs are frequently prescribed “outside their li-
cense”, as when chlorpromazine is administered for
anxiety or insomnia, thioridazine (another antipsychotic)
for alcohol withdrawal, and benzodiazepines for “pretty
much everything…The classification of mental health
conditions gives us a false sense of order…It has little or
no relevance to psychotropic drug action” ([43] p.225).
As part of the development of ICD-11, First et al. [44]
surveyed 1764 mental health professionals, mainly psy-
chiatrists, and found that the majority used ICD-10 or
DSM-5 for administrative or billing purposes only. They
rated such taxonomies as least useful for treatment se-
lection and determining prognosis.
Psychiatry’s own response to these acknowledged
problems has been to redouble its conceptual biological
insistence. For example, the National Institutes of Men-
tal Health are developing a Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC) framework [45] which, even more than DSM,
conceptualises mental illnesses as brain disorders (latent
disease constructs), but which seeks to identify them
through objective behavioural tests and neurobiological
measures such as genetic tests and neuroimaging, rather
than through topographical symptom checklists. This re-
sponse to DSM’s failures has been described as a shift
from the biopsychosocial model of mental disorders to a
“bio-bio-bio model” [46]. It is much more a framework
for biologically-oriented research [47] than a clinical re-
placement for the ICD or DSM [48]. While it tries to be
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more etiological and dimensional than those systems, its
clinical usefulness lies well into the future [49].
The RDoC approach is therefore not at all a solution to
clinical psychology’s problems with the conception of
CPPs as diagnosable mental disorders, which are less to
do with the technical limitations of diagnosis and more to
do with a conceptual mismatch. The proposers and devel-
opers of the RDoC project have attempted to circumvent
the problem that heterogeneous symptom profiles among
diagnosed groups are likely to encompass a large number
of biologically distinct entities [50]. But clinical psycholo-
gists’ concerns are that these groups are likely to encom-
pass a large number of psychologically distinct entities.
So even were the RDoC project to improve diagnostic
reliability, validity, and clinical utility for psychiatrists, it
would still offer no greater attraction to clinical psych-
ology. Clinical psychologists as a group are not as bio-
logically focused or trained, do not prescribe
medications or administer ECT, and in fact in practice
rarely and reluctantly diagnose [51–53]. Instead, they
construct case formulations at a psychological level [54].
The idea that CPPs can and should be reducible to
presumed underlying neurobiological conditions which are
somehow more basic, real, or ‘scientific’ than
psychological-level formulations is not helpful [12], not lo-
gical [55], and, for almost all CPPs, is theoretically prema-
ture [56]. The psychological and the biological are different
levels of analysis, assessment, and intervention [57], and
any alignment of phenomena at these two levels is, by def-
inition, correlational, not causal [55]. It is no more likely
that all CPPs will be reduced in the future to neurobio-
logical conditions than that the geological study of earth-
quakes will be reduced to molecular theory ([57] p. 508).
While it is possible and desirable to theoretically unify
the social sciences and biology, the notion of abandoning
the principles, theories, vocabulary, and laws of the so-
cial sciences in favour of lower-level terms is a “prepos-
terous” proposition [58], which would result in such
theses as “A Comparison of Keats and Shelley from the
Molecular Point of View” or “The Role of Oxygen
Atoms in Supply-Side Economics”. Such “greedy reduc-
tionism” can arise when “in their zeal to explain too
much too fast, scientists and philosophers often under-
estimate the complexities, trying to skip whole layers or
levels of theory” ([58] p.82). “Mental disorders may be
studied at different levels of analysis (e.g. molecular gen-
etics, neurochemistry, cognitive neuroscience, personal-
ity, environment), and no level is inherently superior or
fundamental to any other” ([12] p.856).
Clinical psychologists, when they operate within an ad-
jacent level of analysis – in this case a psychiatric one –
will lose a large, perhaps critical, amount of psychologic-
ally-relevant information. “Psychiatrists using the DSM
diagnosis ‘major depression’ tend to mingle bereaved
patients with both those afflicted by classic melancholia
and those demoralized by circumstances” ([59] p.1854).
So when clinical psychologists allow themselves to be
diverted from the study and psychological-level formula-
tion of CPPs to research into the treatment of DSM-
diagnosed mental disorders, this means that a 19 year
old survivor of 14 years of sexual abuse within her dys-
functional family, who is now sad and amotivational
every day, will be regarded as experiencing precisely the
same CPP as a 73 year old recently bereaved widower
who is also sad and amotivational every day, because
these people share some ‘symptoms’ – some topograph-
ical similarities. They will also find themselves in the
same experimental or control group in a clinical trial of
a particular cognitive therapy or antidepressant medica-
tion, and conclusions about efficacy will then be ex-
tended to other people with even more diverse CPPs,
because they allegedly have the same mental disorder.
It is highly likely that some CPPs currently regarded or
labelled as mental disorders are most usefully assessed, di-
agnosed, and treated within a medical model, but that
some do not conform well to this level of analysis, and will
respond better when assessed and addressed at a psycho-
logical level [59–61]. “Psychiatric diagnoses differ in the
sorts of categories that best capture them” ([60] p.204).
Some may be more categorical than others [62]. There is
some evidence, for example, that anorexia nervosa may be
much less culture-bound and more heritable than bulimia
nervosa [63], and so may be less socially constructed,
more categorical, and a different ‘kind’ of thing. Schizo-
phrenia and a simple reactive dog phobia are also likely to
represent different classes of CPP in this light. The former
more comfortably rests within a taxonomy of ‘mental dis-
orders’ such as the DSM. A reactive dog phobia, on the
other hand, may be more conceptually concordant with
clinical psychology’s own parallel purely psychological-
level taxonomy of CPPs.
It will be a long time – if ever – before a complicated
bereavement is fully explained by reference to a particu-
lar neural bundle, or treated solely with a localized elec-
trical zap or a ‘complicated bereavement pill’. Clinical
psychology and biological psychiatry are different disci-
plines, operating at adjacent but different levels of ana-
lysis, and neither should subsume the other.
Our new conception of CPPs, and its subsequent tax-
onomy, will therefore centre on psychological-level states
and processes – involving cognitions, emotions, behaviours,
and situations or stimuli – and not on biological-level ones.
Mental disorders are social constructions; they have no
essence
Another major problem with equating CPPs with mental
disorders is that this subsumption represents relegation
to a less developed, less theoretically robust, less
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therapeutically relevant level of analysis. This is an inev-
itable consequence of the fact that, whereas our theoret-
ical knowledge of the processes, functions, and
mechanisms underlying CPPs has grown greatly, DSM’s
listing of mental disorders began and has remained stol-
idly atheoretical [8, 32, 64, 65]. DSM has made no claims
about underlying mechanisms, functional processes,
pathophysiology, etiology, and hence treatment implica-
tions of its mental disorders, and is therefore a “weak
medical model” [66].
This deliberate policy was originally so as to accom-
modate a large number of theoretical orientations from
a range of professions or disciplines [32, 35], but also
more recently because, as previously described, the med-
ical model has largely failed to further our understand-
ing of the heterogeneous assortment of disorders the
DSM lists [21]. The sluggish pace of discovery in psych-
iatry has been attributed, in part, to the limited validity
and the arbitrariness of traditional diagnoses [67].
So, whereas a clinical psychologist will see a CPP in-
volving problematic social anxiety, for example, as a
psychological-level persisting negative process that re-
quires case formulation and specific subsequent
psychological-level intervention, according to DSM a So-
cial Anxiety Disorder is a state or condition identified
(but not explained) by its symptoms. How do we know
that Bill has a Social Anxiety Disorder? He shows
enough symptoms. What caused these symptoms? His
Social Anxiety Disorder. There is no evidence that the
mental disorder or mental illness called “Social Anxiety
Disorder (Social Phobia)” (DSM300.23) actually exists. It
has no ‘essence’. There are no reliable or validated bio-
logical markers or measures outside clinical psycho-
logical judgement that can detect this illness. It is
defined by its effects, which are attributed to its exist-
ence [52]. It is an assumption – a convention – con-
structed for sociological or political reasons, just as the
disease model of alcohol problems and the chemical im-
balance theory of depression were. They were developed
in an attempt to reduce stigma or encourage people to
take their antidepressants. But no evidence supportive of
their veracity has emerged since.
So the concept of ‘mental disorders’ is inadequate to
supplant that of CPPs because it is descriptive only –
not at all explanatory. But such disorders are therefore
also inevitably vaguely and arbitrarily defined and de-
marcated. “Diagnostic criteria [in psychiatry] shift and
sway like in no other area of medicine” [43]. The DSM
meanders between at least seven different criteria in dis-
tinguishing non-problems from problems-deserving-
therapy (mental disorders). At different times DSM spe-
cifies: (i) A certain symptom cluster. Three or more
symptoms from a field of seven are required to diagnose
an Antisocial Personality Disorder. (ii) A certain level of
distress. In OCD “the obsessions or compulsions… cause
clinically significant distress”. (iii) A level of dysfunction.
This is required for a diagnosis of Specific Phobia. (iv) A
certain type of etiology. This marks a Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) or a Substance-Induced Sexual
Dysfunction. (v) A statistical deviation. To diagnose a
Female Orgasmic Disorder requires a “marked infre-
quency” of orgasms. (vi) The chemistry involved. This
determines an Alcohol-Related Disorder. And (vii) dur-
ation is a criterion determining the presence of an Acute
Stress Disorder or Dysthymia [10]. One or two clear
conceptual criteria to distinguish CPPs from ‘normal
problems in life’ would be much preferred.
When arbitrary categories are forced onto dimensional
phenomena like symptoms, then both reliability and val-
idity have been shown to suffer [68–70]. Not only have
no biological markers for the common mental disorders
been uncovered, but this arbitrarily interchangeable col-
lection of criteria for determining their presence means
that not a single mental disorder has been established as
a discrete categorical entity, as opposed to a dimensional
outlier [71, 72].
This conceptual vacuum has left ‘mental disorders’ as
merely social constructions [60], ‘open concepts’ [73], or
‘practical kinds’ [15, 40] without a true defining essence
[27], and has resulted in intractable and interminable de-
bates among psychologists and psychiatrists as to what
ultimately defines a mental disorder [53]. Hence we have
seen the inclusion and then exclusion in 1974 of homo-
sexuality [74], and historical arguments over ‘childhood
masturbation disorder’ and ‘lack of vaginal orgasm’ [75].
Right up to today, clinicians and researchers have criti-
cized the seemingly unsystematic and arbitrary addition
in DSM-5 of “bizarre new illnesses” such as Excoriation
Disorder (skin picking), Major Depressive Disorder 2
weeks after a bereavement, or Somatic Symptom Dis-
order when one is adjudged ‘too upset’ when told of a
cancer diagnosis [14]. New diagnoses have mostly arisen
when a few influential insiders have decided that a new
category would be clinically meaningful and handy, and
have lobbied for its inclusion [76].
Unlike mental disorders, CPPs must be ‘natural kinds’
of things in the world [77, 78] with a defined essence
[79], that delineates a category else they revert, like men-
tal disorders, to being merely dimensional variants of
normality [80, 81]. Such a capitulation, in which we
merely choose to call something a mental disorder or a
CPP when it has gone far enough to bother us, is a sur-
render to the opposite, postmodern extreme [82, 83] in
which problems may be explained by a “medical narra-
tive” no more or less legitimately than by a learning
theory-based narrative, or by “socio-political, spiritual or
paranormal explanations” [14]. When a conceptual over-
reach leads to the abandonment of the scientific method
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altogether, the need for a ‘paradigm shift’ is urgently
indicated.
It is generally recognized in all fields of scientific en-
deavour that it is preferable that concepts be essentialist
rather than undefined or arbitrary [61], and categorical ra-
ther than dimensional [84] or merely nominal [81]. For
example, it is epistemologically and clinically much more
useful if disorders can be conceptualized in terms of
pathological processes rather than being solely descriptive
[81]. After a century of successful, progressive research
and practice in clinical psychology, we are more than
confident that CPPs exist in the real world [8], and are
qualitatively different from normality, but depend on a cli-
ent’s, a therapist’s, or society’s evaluation. That is, that
CPPs are a form of ‘harmful dysfunction’ [75] where the
harm is a judgement, but the dysfunction is objective [85].
Though CPPs are almost universally and intuitively
regarded as qualitatively different from normality, much
theoretically important research has focussed on dimen-
sional constructs and their relationships with (even
barely valid) categories such as mental disorders. This
has occurred because each approach (dimensional or
categorical) has its advantages in different contexts [86].
When testing hypotheses, dimensional measures in re-
search retain more information than categories, espe-
cially for phenomena that are distributed fairly
continuously, and with unclear boundaries [70].
Categories are also highly dependent on appropriate
cutpoints. We know that cutpoints for most mental dis-
orders are fuzzy and somewhat arbitrary. This is why
they are barely categorical. And this is also why most di-
mensional models of psychopathology focus on the per-
sonality disorders [87]. They have even more ‘fuzzy
boundaries’ than the other mental disorders.
Hence, recognising the problems that DSM-5 and ICD-
10 have had with arbitrary thresholds, large category over-
laps, and low clinical utility, the new ICD-11 has adopted
a dimensional approach to personality disorder classifica-
tion with 5 trait qualifiers: Negative Affectivity, Detach-
ment, Dissociality, Disinhibition, and Anankastia [88].
Whereas DSM-5 and ICD-10 require a quota of criteria to
be met (e.g. 5 of 9) to define a disorder, ICD-11 diagnoses
Personality Disorder via global evaluation of personality
functioning, where the clinician may specify 5 evidence-
based trait dimensions that contribute to the unique ex-
pression of personality disturbance.
It has been claimed that WHO’s ICD-11 is less entirely
based on tradition and authority than the DSM [48] as it
is more empirically derived, in that dimensional ap-
proaches correspond better to the observed data than do
purely categorical ones [47]. Continuous (dimensional)
measures of psychopathology have been found to in-
crease both the reliability and the validity of assessments
over discrete (categorical) measures [70]. Subsequent to
this, Reed, Sharan et al. [89] found the reliability of ICD-
11’s guidelines to be superior to that previously reported
for equivalent ICD-10 guidelines, and Reed, Keeley, et al.
[90] found clinicians rated the clinical utility of ICD-11’s
diagnostic guidelines very positively with regard to ease
of use, but still poorly for treatment selection.
Note that the dimensions of personality functions here
refer to processes rather than static traits or features, and
therefore this assessment of functioning more closely ap-
proximates a functional analysis than a diagnostic check-
list. And it therefore can potentially more closely lead to
therapeutic conclusions [88]. “[T]reatment should target
what the Personality Disorder does to the patient (i.e.,
severity), as we cannot change what it is (i.e., traits).”
These changes of direction embodied in the soon to be
implemented ICD-11 are a response to the recognition
that psychotherapeutic interventions are often transdiag-
nostic [91]. However, they offer only a clinically useful di-
mensional overlay to a categorical ‘mental disorder’
conceptualisation – not a paradigm shift. “Advances in
psychiatric research in general, and progress in nosological
science in particular, will continue to be iterative….but no
evidence has suggested that genetic or other biological in-
formation will lead to a paradigm shift in diagnostic classi-
fication in the immediate future” ([91] p.7).
However, clinicians and clinical researchers generally re-
quire a categorical approach [86] because they need to
constantly decide whether to treat or not, whether to hos-
pitalise or not, or which drug or psychotherapy to apply,
or not. ICD-11, as well as DSM-5 must be predominantly
categorical for administrative and treatment selection pur-
poses. Such decisions are categorical, even if the data
underlying them is dimensional [48].
For our purposes, the cutpoints and criteria for the de-
termination of the presence of a CPP must be clearer, bet-
ter validated, and more essentialist than those for the
diagnosis of mental disorders. Dimensional measures give
us indications as to the statistical significance of a rela-
tionship or an outcome, but categorical approaches tell us
more about their clinical significance – whether a qualita-
tive difference has been created or detected, or merely a
possibly-trivial change in one psychometric score.
The usual structure of research projects in this field has
been to explore the relationships between dimensional
constructs and factors, such as ‘anxiety sensitivity’, and cat-
egorical problems, such as generalised anxiety disorder
(GAD) [92] even though GAD as a construct has poor val-
idity, dubious reliability, and an arbitrary cutpoint. Hence,
it has been noted that the cycle of progress that is meant
to occur between dimensional research in psychiatry and
clinical diagnostic accuracy has not eventuated [86, 93].
When dimensional measures are used in research on
mental disorders, the richer data has provided even
more evidence that DSM diagnoses correlate poorly with
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these measures, and that they better predict certain psy-
chological processes than psychopathological conditions.
For example, Melville et al. [94] found that problem be-
haviours, rated or scored dimensionally, among adults
with intellectual disabilities, loaded in a factor analysis
within an emotion dysregulation/problem behaviour di-
mension, not within depressive, anxiety, organic, or
psychosis dimensions or factors.
Similarly, when the relationship between the dimen-
sional construct ‘dispositional negativity’ and adverse
outcomes such as ‘emotional disorders’ is studied [95], a
“dynamic cascade of processes” – presumably amenable
to functional analysis – is uncovered; not a simple rela-
tionship with one or two diagnosed mental disorders.
Further, when dimensional psychopathology measures
are factor analysed across a population, a strong general
psychopathology factor emerges. Carragher et al. [96]
concluded from this that transdiagnostic treatment ap-
proaches are indicated and warranted, and the domain
of psychopathology should be restructured in an
empirically-based manner, as has recently commenced
through the HiTOP consortium [69].
So dimensional approaches to CPPs or to mental disor-
ders can be very valuable, especially in research. But it
would be preferable that any psychological-level alterna-
tive to the categorical diagnosis of mental disorders be a
more evidence-based and essentialist categorical concep-
tion of CPPs.
Therefore, any new conception of CPPs must, by con-
trast with DSM’s mental disorders, be theory-rich,
evidence-based, problematic-by-judgement, real-by-
nature (essentialist), categorical (qualitatively distinct
from normality) according to only one or two reliable
and valid criteria, and must recognise various conceptual
kinds of psychological problem.
Treatment-relevant case formulation versus nominative
diagnosis
With further regard to the DSM system’s natural taxo-
nomic inadequacies for clinical psychologists, because
the vast majority of psychologists seek to intervene at a
psychological level (i.e. in situations, thoughts, feelings,
and behaviours), they are much more interested in de-
veloping a process- or functional- or mechanism-
focused case formulation than a symptom-derived diag-
nosis. Clinical practice is predominantly theory-based ra-
ther than manual-prescriptive [53].
Whereas psychiatric practice is more and more domi-
nated by the process of deriving DSM diagnoses, [32,
97], an examination of the UK’s Generic Professional
Practice Guidelines for psychologists, or the APS’s Col-
lege of Clinical Psychologists Course Approval Guide-
lines, shows that “training programs for clinical
psychologists emphasize formulation rather than
diagnosis” ([52] (p.448). Formulation is fundamental to
clinical psychology in the same way that diagnosis is fun-
damental to psychiatry [51], and DSM diagnosis is often
irrelevant to psychological practice [20, 54].
Among the advantages of the case formulation ap-
proach identified by the BPS’s Division of Clinical Psych-
ology [17, 98] are much greater treatment-relevance,
strengthening of the therapeutic alliance, normalization
of problems, providing a sense of hope, reducing blame,
and increasing collaboration and empathy.
With regard to treatment-relevance and clinical utility,
even for psychiatrists the DSM “describes a collection of
disorders, not an integrated system of psychopathology”
([31] (p.147). Many existing diagnoses encompass mul-
tiple pathological processes [33]. DSM’s search for reli-
ability of diagnosis at the cost of theoretical integration
and validity [84] plus its high rates of comorbidity, high
frequency of “Other Specified/Unspecified” (previously
“Not Otherwise Specified”) diagnoses, and divergent and
overlapping criteria sets make for little guidance in
choice of treatments [25].
But especially for clinical psychologists, who are more
concerned with psychological-level case formulation, in
most cases a DSM diagnosis tells one little about eti-
ology, course, choice of treatment, or treatment response
[52, 99–103]. “Identifying a disorder by its symptoms
does not translate into understanding it. Clinicians need
some heuristic concept of its nature, grasped in terms of
cause or mechanism” ([104] p.1845).
A clinical psychologist basing treatment on a DSM
diagnosis in place of a case formulation is like a dietician
assessing the adequacy of a person’s diet by taking a
height measurement, instead of interviewing the person.
Height measurement is a much more reliable, consistent,
brief, and precise process, but far too much validity and
treatment relevance are lost.
Therefore, the new conception and taxonomy of CPPs
must be formulation-relevant and treatment-relevant, and
not just a listing of surface-symptom-defined diagnoses.
Processes or mechanisms versus topographical description
Tucker [97] admitted that, by contrast with the rest of
modern medicine, in psychiatry “we are still doing pat-
tern recognition” (p.159). This approach falls down
when the same pattern or topography can be established
by diverse processes, or when different topographies can
come from the same process [35]. These phenomena
have come to be known as the problems of multifinality
and divergent trajectories [105]. Multifinality [106] refers
to how one general transdiagnostic risk factor or process
can result in several different disorders, as when stress
[107] can contribute to the development of several dif-
ferent CPPs involving anxiety, depression, or alcohol
abuse. Divergent trajectories occur when more proximal or
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moderating variables, such as attentional biases, result in
OCD in one person, but a sleep disorder in another [105].
The DSM system has ignored these issues and focused
on final symptoms and their topography, saying nothing
about mechanisms. We need to comprehend psycho-
pathological disorders “not simply by their outward
show but by the causal processes and generative mecha-
nisms known to provoke them” ([104] p.1855).
Major problems such as treatment irrelevance and ex-
cessive unexplained comorbidities have resulted [28–30].
In the clinical psychological literature these comorbidi-
ties, such as between Major Depressive Disorder, Gener-
alized Anxiety Disorder, and Dysthymia [108], are
assumed to reflect the many similarities of inputs, symp-
toms, and processes among the various models of par-
ticular CPPs.
All of these factors have led to the recent development
of transdiagnostic models of psychopathology [109–111]
which seek to identify fundamental processes underlying
multiple, often comorbid, psychopathologies [105, 112].
Mechanisms across the disorders, such as negative at-
tentional bias [113], experiential avoidance [114], safety
behaviours, or rumination [115] have been studied, and
transdiagnostic treatment programs that target these
processes rather than individual diagnoses have then
been developed [4, 109, 116, 117]. This naturally follows
the finding that more than half of patients who present
with depressive disorders also have elevated comorbid
anxiety symptoms, and that, when psychotherapy for de-
pression is undertaken, anxiety can be significantly ame-
liorated [118]. Very few studies have examined this issue
because the literature is strictly structured around indi-
vidual psychiatric disorders [118].
Current transdiagnostic approaches circumvent the
problem of the plethora of manualized treatment pro-
grams for a growing number of specific diagnoses [119],
so that the training of therapists and development of
treatment packages can be more parsimonious [4].
The taxonomic arm of this empirically-based trans-
diagnostic movement – the Hierarchical Taxonomy Of
Psychopathology (HiTOP) consortium – grew out of the
psychological study of individual differences [120]. Its
rich vein of studies [121–123] establishing an alternative
dimensional organization of psychopathology helps to
overcome such problems with traditional nosologies as
the issue of arbitrary thresholds and subsequent loss of
information, ensuing reliability problems, diagnostic het-
erogeneity, theoretically disruptive high comorbidities
[120], and exclusion of undiagnosable ‘subthreshold’
people with serious CPPs [49, 69, 124].
The emergent HiTOP dimensions form a hierarchy
with five levels (symptoms, syndromes, subfactors, etc.),
and can thus help explain why disorders from different
classes respond to the same treatment (e.g. social anxiety
responding to antidepressants) [49]. In this way it is a
critical part of the transdiagnostic movement.
But the HiTOP hierarchical dimensional models of
classification, though guided by research [120] are still
the result of a consensus among the consortium [49], re-
quire interpretation by human experts [48], and the ap-
proach suffers from all the problems of a dimensional
taxonomy. It has not, to date, been used clinically, as the
consortium has yet to develop meaningful cut-off points
for pathology [49]. It can still only offer a dimensional
elaboration, based on symptom measurements, on top
of a categorical ‘disorder’ model [48], because it still
does not implicate proximal causes for, and the ‘essence’
of, CPPs. It is a descriptive phenotypic model, and does
not directly incorporate etiology and underlying mecha-
nisms [49]. It shares many of the same constructs with
the categorical model frameworks [120] such as a focus
on ‘mental disorders’.
For example, when Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins
[105] have suggested ways to explain multifinality and
divergent trajectories in terms of distal, proximal, and
moderating causes or risk factors (p. 592), they have
done so via a flow chart resulting in (DSM-type) ‘Dis-
order A’, ‘Disorder B’, and ‘Disorder C’. Despite emphasis-
ing that we need more focus on the precise mechanisms
involved (p.591), the transdiagnostic movement still
regards an Anxiety Disorder as the same CPP whether it
has arisen through a mechanism of avoidance or of ru-
mination. The necessary ‘paradigm shift’ would see these
two situations as different CPPs.
As psychological interventions increasingly target
mechanisms, such as specific cognitive dysfunctions, ra-
ther than symptom-based mental disorders, a new com-
prehensive conceptual framework to assemble the
results of psychotherapy research will be required
[125].. The transdiagnostic movement has not to date
offered a ‘paradigm shift’; only a useful extra (dimen-
sional) layer, such as allowing for variables such as ‘neur-
oticism’ or ‘extraversion’ in treatment selection [119], on
a categorical ‘mental disorder’ conceptual system.
But also, these transdiagnostic processes and proper-
ties are dimensional responses to problems with the cat-
egorical assumptions of DSM [64]. The assumption is
that the heterogeneous disorders in DSM are made up
of dysfunctional versions of processes that vary along
continua in the general population [45, 126]. For ex-
ample, attentional bias toward negative information is
common in people without [113]. Within the transdiag-
nostic movement to date, such a bias cannot be regarded
as essential or diagnostic. So there remain problems of
cut-off points, a quality distinction between different
problems rather than a quantity distinction, and the very
definition or essence of CPPs. A categorical conception
of CPPs is preferable [61, 84, 86]. It is much preferable
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that CPPs, unlike mental disorders, display an essence –
that they be more than just ‘worse than normal’.
It has been argued that dimensional data can lead to
actionable ‘diagnoses’ in medicine [69], so why not in
clinical psychology? For example diagnoses are deter-
mined, and treatments initiated, from blood pressure
measurements and fasting glucose levels using indicative
ranges of scores. However, even in medicine, this is
regarded as second best. It is much preferable to un-
cover some clear, qualitatively distinct pathology such as
an infection or a lesion, than to find that a score looks
too high or too low. Is it better to treat every adult per-
son under a height of 4′6″ with growth hormone, or to
reserve this treatment for people who are not producing
their own growth hormone?
Hence, the new conception of CPPs will focus on
mechanisms and processes, not states or conditions. But
beyond the current transdiagnostic movement, it will re-
gard the operation of these processes as essential, defini-
tive, and ‘diagnostic’. Thus a categorical conception will
emerge, not a merely dimensional one.
Some CPPs are clearly not mental disorders
In examining what clinical psychologists actually address
in research and practice, a stark example of the non-
equivalence of CPPs and mental disorders can be found
in the fact that clinical psychologists address relation-
ship, marital, and family problems using the exact same
assessment and treatment models as for, for example,
anxiety or depression problems. Such interpersonal situ-
ations clearly cannot be conceptualised as internal men-
tal disorders, and so DSM has relegated “relational
pathology” to a terse footnoted ‘V’-code listing, an omis-
sion long lamented [127, 128]. As a bizarre and unfortu-
nate consequence, when a clinical psychologist sees a
couple or family in the Australian Medicare system they
are not eligible for a fee rebate unless one attending
party has been given a mental disorder diagnosis by the
referring medical practitioner and is being treated for
this. ‘No blame’ relationship therapy will not be rebated.
A similarly bizarre and unfortunate result of the con-
ceptual medicalization of CPPs arises with parenting
problems. Patterson [129] has described how parent-
child interactions frequently directly reinforce deviant
behaviour, and he has outlined the role of parent-child
discipline practices in the development and maintenance
of aggressive behaviour in children. These insights led to
the development of the most empirically supported
treatment for such problems – Parent Management
Training [130]. But, again, to be eligible for a rebate in
Australia, not only must the child have a diagnosis of,
for example, Conduct Disorder, but the child must at-
tend each consultation. The assumption is that the prob-
lem resides within the child, as would a lesion or
infection, and so the mental disorder must be in attend-
ance for treatment to be conferred.
However, perhaps the largest class of CPPs effectively
addressed by clinicians, but barely researched because
they are not ‘mental disorders’, lies in the third to half of
all people who seek clinical psychological help but can-
not be given a clear diagnosis because their problems do
not fit criteria and categories neatly [131]. They may be
‘subthreshold’ [132], or ‘subclinical’ [133], or situation-
specific (such as being evidenced only at work). High
levels of distress commonly occur in the absence of a
diagnosable condition [134], as when one or two symp-
toms occur very strongly, but three or more are required
for a diagnosis [135]. Should clinical psychologists turn
away people presenting with such CPPs because they do
not have a diagnosed mental disorder?
Therefore, not all CPPs are internal mental disorders
detectable and definable by a certain intensity of symp-
tom presentation. They are more likely to be particular
sorts of psychological-level processes, which can occur
between people as well as within them.
Social consequences of seeing all CPPs as mental
disorders
Promotion of the disease model of CPPs has often oc-
curred in an attempt to ameliorate the serious stigma
consequent upon the ‘moral failing’, sinfulness, or
demonic possession models of CPPs [136, 137]. The
medical model has been advanced as a simple solution
to the “brain or blame” dilemma or the “chemistry or
character” dichotomy as to whether a person’s mental
suffering is real, or they should be told to pull them-
selves together [14].
Clinicians’ models affect the community’s beliefs and
hence sympathetic or stigmatizing attitudes [8]. Psych-
iatry was aware of this when it promoted the disease
model of alcoholism in an attempt to reduce stigma and
punitive responses, and increase treatment takeup and
compliance [138]. Support groups have used the fact
that the concept of mental illness has been arbitrarily
defined to agitate for problems such as depression or al-
cohol dependence to be regarded as diseases, hoping to
reduce stigmatization and increase service or research
funding [85].
However, in many areas this strategy has backfired,
and the personal and social consequences of a psycho-
pathological label have proven to be negative, fatalistic,
adverse, and stigmatizing [139]. The “disease like any
other” campaigns to convince the public that mental dis-
orders are non-volitional biological illnesses for which
sufferers do not deserve blame and discrimination have
been “an unequivocal failure in reducing stigma” ([12]
p.852). For example, with regard to attitudes to depres-
sion and schizophrenia, Schomerus et al. [140] found
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that (a) belief in the biomedical model has increased, (b)
acceptance of medical treatment has increased, but (c)
attitudes toward people with mental disorders has not
improved.
A diagnosis of a mental disorder can often be a cause
of disempowerment and social exclusion [141], and may
label the person rather than the problem [142]. A diag-
nosis of mental illness is known to negatively affect self-
identity, attract stigma [143], result in a negative prog-
nosis, and engender isolation [144, 145]. People who be-
lieve that mental distress is a kind of biological illness
are more likely to see psychiatric patients as dangerous
and unpredictable [146, 147]. They may blame less, but
will fear and avoid patients more [148], and will assume
a worse prognosis [147, 149].
Such deleterious consequences are exacerbated by
DSM’s assertion that all of the following are examples of
the one kind of thing. They are all equally ‘mental disor-
ders’: Mild Tobacco Use Disorder, Schizophrenia, Female
Orgasmic Disorder, Delirium, Restless Legs Syndrome,
Alzheimer’s Disease, a Spider Phobia, and Opioid Intoxi-
cation. Admitting to sadness 2 weeks after one’s spouse
has died can put one in the same class, conceptually, as a
paranoid schizophrenic, a smoker, a person suffering a
panic disorder, or a violent psychopath.
These consequences of problem assessment and prob-
lem formulation are not inevitable. It has been claimed
that a psychological case formulation or functional ana-
lysis approach both avoids the problem of stigmatization
[52] and the abdication of responsibility [150] of a men-
tal disorder diagnosis. This provides further reason that
the new conception of CPPs needs to be psychological-
level and formulation-based.
Research on CPPs versus mental disorders
Although in practice clinical psychologists formulate
much more than they diagnose, almost all research in the
discipline ignores this fact. To be considered methodo-
logically sound, and hence to qualify for funding, almost
all psychotherapy research must be undertaken with for-
mally diagnosed subjects with the intention of ‘curing’
them of their mental disorders by removing their symp-
toms. However in real-world clinical practice case formu-
lation guides treatment, which targets psychological
processes, not symptom profiles. Treatment outcome
measured by “escape from diagnosis” is in this light arbi-
trary, misleading, and inadequate.
Research trials have typically treated highly selected
groups with a single diagnosis, while in clinical practice
patients have many comorbidities and atypical symptom
profiles [54, 119]. Clinicians are more likely to apply sev-
eral interventions, and will base this on the individual
case formulation they have developed, on the
assumption that each technique is targeting something
different. When experimental subjects are merely diag-
nosed and then randomly allocated to comparative treat-
ment groups, they will have an undetermined
distribution of relevant underlying mechanisms [151]. A
‘package’ approach ignores basic psychological science
and the individual needs of individual clients, is atheo-
retical, and alienates research from clinical practice
[151].
Important comparative studies on various CBTs for
depression, such as cognitive therapy (CT) versus behav-
ioural activation (e.g. [152, 153]), or for anxiety prob-
lems, such as exposure therapy (ET) versus CT (e.g.
[154, 155]), have not been able to find consistent differ-
ences between comparative treatments [151]. Michelson
et al. [156], for example, were unable to separate the
benefits of cognitive, behavioural, and psychophysio-
logical treatments for agoraphobia, though all three were
superior to a wait-list control. This is unsurprising,
though, when subjects are DSM-diagnosed and then
randomly allocated to groups, as though they all have
the same CPP. It assumes a diagnosis-to-treatment-se-
lection link. This is an example of theory governing the
nature of research. However, the medical model of DSM
is so entrenched that many researchers would not even
see this difference ([21] p.157).
“There are undoubtedly many functionally distinct
subtypes of patients currently mixed together in popular
diagnostic systems” ([102] p.971). For example, agora-
phobics may have a classically conditioned fear of separ-
ation, or a fear of panic attacks. Further, this latter fear
may in turn be of medical catastrophes or of social em-
barrassment [151]. Over a quarter century ago, Wolpe
[157, 158] warned that such neglect of individual differ-
ences in the dysfunctional processes that occur within a
diagnostic group puts us in danger of making a mockery
out of group treatment outcome research.
A major motivation of the HiTOP consortium has
been the fact that randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
rarely show superiority among thoughtfully conceived
treatment packages [120], and that research has found
that many interventions can be beneficial with a host of
problems regarded as distinct categorically [118].
This problem has been thoroughly outlined by Smith,
McCarthy, and Zapolski [159], who have pointed out
that assessing the effect of CT versus ET on a DSM-
defined ‘Depression’ group is an example of assessing
the relationship of a construct or variable with another
multidimensional construct or measure (such as PTSD
or Neuroticism) which has multiple (diagnostic) criteria.
The resultant composite correlation will be an average
of the correlations with each of the dimensions or cri-
teria, each of which could correlate quite weakly with
the others.
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The power of RCTs is seriously compromised when
the groups that subjects are randomized into are vaguely
or spuriously defined. “With heterogeneous treatment
effects, the ATE [average treatment effect] is only as
good as the study sample from which it was obtained”
[160]. This is why researchers have begun to focus on
transdiagnostic mechanisms of intervention [161]. “Diag-
nostic heterogeneity compels the clinician to go beyond
the assigned diagnosis and generate individual-level for-
mulations that are not codified in the diagnostic
scheme” ([120] p.6).
It will be of much greater benefit when we are able to
assemble research results into clinical guidelines not on
‘the treatment of Depression’ or ‘of Bulimia Nervosa’, but
on psychological interventions with CPPs A and B, de-
fined by mechanisms, which may cross diagnoses or dif-
fer within a diagnosis. For example, we know that
targeting specific mediating cognitive processes in a so-
cial phobia is more effective than standardized generic
cognitive-behavioural treatment [162], because the men-
tal disorder ‘Social Anxiety Disorder’ can encompass a
number of (mechanism-defined) CPPs.
Conclusions
A new conception of CPPs must therefore be: (a) A psy-
chological-level one (i.e. involving cognitions, behav-
iours, emotions, and situations); (b) Psychologically
theoretically rich and evidence-based; not a postmodern
‘categories-by-convention-only’ model. It must define an
essence. If it comprises a ‘harmful dysfunction’ (Wake-
field, 1992), then its harmfulness must be a matter of
subjective judgement, but its dysfunction must be de-
fined objectively; And according to only one or two cri-
teria, not a hodgepodge of them; (c) Categorical, rather
than merely dimensional; (d) Encompassing of all prob-
lems currently appropriately and successfully addressed
by clinical psychologists; not merely diagnosed mental
disorders; And (e) better at avoiding the stigma and
responsibility-confusion problems which have been ex-
acerbated rather than ameliorated by the disease model.
Seeking the essence of clinical psychological
problems
By examining what clinical psychologists actually re-
search and address in their clinical practice, we have
come quite close to uncovering the essence of CPPs.
Thus far we are clearer about what constitute ‘psycho-
logical problems’.
‘Psychological problems’
Clinical psychology, like forensic psychology or clinical
neuropsychology, is an applied remedial discipline. To
remedy is to rectify or make good, to cure or heal, to
put right or restore, or to counteract or remove.
Therefore the new taxonomy will list problems – nega-
tive ‘states of affairs’ that are undesired, aversive, in-
appropriate, maladaptive, or dysfunctional. This loose
listing of potential criteria is an indication that the ul-
timate judgement as to what constitutes a ‘problem’ will
inevitably be largely subjective and value-laden, based on
‘presenting problem’ (the client’s standpoint), social
norms (society’s standpoint), or psychometric measures
(the therapist’s standpoint). Unlike mental disorders,
CPPs will not be of their nature problematic. They will
have to be deemed problematic.
CPPs are by definition at a psychological level of ana-
lysis. That is, at the level of stimuli, cognitions, emotions,
and behaviour. Therefore, the new taxonomy to be pro-
posed will not be a listing of biological dysfunctions or of
problems faced by communities, cities, nations, or the hu-
man species. Sociologists and anthropologists can work at
such taxonomies.
It may include, however, problems at an interpersonal,
couple, or family level. Clinical psychology has studied
these, and does provide remediation at this level. In this
respect CPPs are further distinguished from mental dis-
orders, because the biological level of analysis, which
DSM’s mental disorders aspire to, is conceptually as well
as practically discordant with relationship problems.
Very few would recommend that we medicate a faltering
relationship.
‘Clinical Psychological Problems’
But what makes psychological problems clinical? That
is, what makes them warrant interventive clinical psy-
chological therapy? If a taxonomy of CPPs is to be
treatment-relevant, then not only will different CPPs
imply different treatments, but the very definition of a
CPP will include a criterion of being treatment-worthy.
To feel sad is a negative psychological-level state of af-
fairs – a psychological problem. But it can also be an ap-
propriate, constructive, natural, ‘healthy’, adaptive, or
functional problem to have, as in normal grieving. What
determines when this state of affairs warrants interven-
tion? When does it become clinical? Is it simply a matter
of degree – a dimensional criterion? Or can it be cat-
egorical – a qualitative criterion?
Table 1 lists a number of negative but overwhelmingly
spontaneously-remitting psychological-level problems,
and CPPs (using current DSM mental disorder labels)
with similar topographies or phenomenologies. How can
we tell whether a person is obsessed by food because he
is being careful with his diet this week, rather than be-
cause he has an ‘eating disorder’? How can we distin-
guish a ‘huff ’ between a husband and wife, from a
relationship problem that requires intervention? One an-
swer would be ‘Time will tell’. But what occurs differ-
ently during this time?
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Studies of the extremely common negative situations
or reactions listed in Table 1 (‘psychological problems’)
show that they generally do not self-perpetuate and they
tend to ease without interventive therapy. This has been
found to be the case in most grief reactions [163, 164],
acute stress reactions [165], the spontaneous remission
of many psychological problems [166], and in all our
daily experience.
What is the essential difference between a person in a
depressed state, perhaps experiencing a grief reaction,
and a person whose depressed state justifies, and can
benefit from, interventive therapy? A person experien-
cing a natural, healthy grief reaction following a bereave-
ment (a psychological-level problem, but not a CPP) can
present phenomenologically quite severely. She may tick
most of a symptom list. This cannot therefore define a
CPP, as she may well be following a natural course to-
ward resolution (as the majority of bereaved people do).
That is, the process occurring – not the ‘symptoms’ or
their severity – will determine whether a CPP is present
and intervention is warranted. This criterion can be cat-
egorical: Either an undesired, harmful, or dysfunctional
process is occurring, or it is not.
Therefore, the essence of CPPs lies in a mechanism or
process of maintenance, which can be discovered through
functional analysis or case formulation, and which then
requires and justifies (‘clinical’) psychological-level inter-
vention or therapy to disrupt it.
A mechanism or process…
The overwhelming majority of people who experience
the grief of loss emerge from this process without clin-
ical intervention [167, 168]. But symptoms do not distin-
guish or predict who will recover within a reasonable
timeframe and who will not. DSM-5 [10] merely states
that a Bereavement reaction or a “normative stress reac-
tion” may be called an Adjustment Disorder “when the
magnitude of the distress…exceeds what normally would
be expected” (p.289) – a dimensional, not a categorical
criterion – and a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder
may only be given after 2 weeks after the loss ([10]
p.160) – a highly controversial pronouncement [169].
The most comprehensive and influential evidence-
based grief theories are the Dual-Process Model of
Stroebe and Schut [170] and Worden’s Task-Based
Model [171]. These both describe processes that are nat-
ural and usually successful. Could complicated grief
[172], prolonged grief [168, 173], or Major Depression
be best defined and distinguished by a different process?
Especially one that is cyclic and self-perpetuating rather
than linear and progressive. This would explain why rou-
tine intervention for bereavement is not generally rec-
ommended, and “may interfere with ‘natural’ grieving
processes” ([174] p.140).
….Of maintenance…
What is the necessary and sufficient condition that can
distinguish a person simply experiencing anxiety from a
person with a clinical anxiety-related problem who can
benefit from interventive therapy? A comparison be-
tween an acute stress reaction and Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) can illustrate this difference.
Around 60% of men and 50% of women will experi-
ence one or more significantly traumatic events in their
lives [175, 176]. Extreme distress is common in the im-
mediate aftermath of a traumatic event [177]. In the first
weeks after a traumatic event most people experience re-
curring distress in response to reminders, and re-live the
event in memories, dreams, and flashbacks [178, 179].
Acute stress reactions are unpleasant, and so they are a
‘psychological problem’. However, they generally fade over
time [180] and most people will recover spontaneously
with some support [177]. A majority of people who experi-
ence a traumatic event do not develop PTSD [181]. The
lifetime prevalence of PTSD is approximately 8% 176].
Because DSM diagnosis is symptom-profile-based, and
many people experience severe symptoms in the imme-
diate aftermath of trauma, DSM has defined an interim
disorder – Acute Stress Disorder (ASD). However,
around the same proportion of trauma survivors with or
without ASD symptoms – with other symptoms or with
sub-clinical symptoms – can go on to develop PTSD
[182]. Also, trauma can lead to other classes of problem,
especially depression [183]. So the experience of a trau-
matic event and the immediate presence of ASD or
PTSD-like symptoms are poor predictors of PTSD [165].
Better predictors as to whether initial learned alarms be-
come a persistent problem and “snowball” ([180] p.15]
into full-blown PTSD include accessibility of social
Table 1 Negative situations or reactions and their corresponding
‘psychopathological’ counterparts.‘Symptoms’ do not distinguish
or define the ‘pathology’. So what does?
Psychological Problems Clinical Psychological Problems
Grief reaction Depression
Acute stress reactions Post-traumatic stress disorder
Binge Bulimic disorder
Anxious state Anxiety disorder




Pain Chronic pain syndrome
Tantrum Impulse control disorder
Worry over health Somatoform disorder
Fussiness OCD
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support, and the trauma survivor’s coping style [184]. A
key feature of the latter is whether it is predominantly
an avoidant coping style [185–187], whether this be cog-
nitive or behavioural avoidance [188, 189].
It is no coincidence that two of the most recom-
mended treatment elements for PTSD are prolonged in
vivo exposure therapy and imaginal exposure to flash-
backs [190]. With regard to in vivo exposure, Wirtz and
Harrell [191] found that either spontaneous or planned
exposure to triggers associated with a trauma soon after
the event reduced the likelihood of experiencing persist-
ing distress. Such exposure seems to be how distress dis-
sipates for the majority of trauma survivors [180].
Similarly, cognitive avoidance is undesirable when cogni-
tive confrontation is necessary, as with obsessive or
PTSD flashback problems [192].
Such a summation of this research shows that the devel-
opment of PTSD from an acute stress reaction is a func-
tion of maintenance processes that can occur in the
aftermath of a trauma. If, on the other hand, treatment is
directed at symptoms, then this can interfere with adaptive
processes. Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) and
other such proactive interventive treatments administered
early in an acute stress reaction have been found to be in-
effective, or even counterproductive, in the prevention of
PTSD [177, 193–197], just as routine intervention after a
bereavement is contraindicated [174].
This critical maintenance criterion for CPPs holds that
psychological problems such as sadness or anxiety
(problematic emotions), preoccupations or obsessions
(problematic cognitions), or classroom disruptive behav-
iour or frequent handwashing (problematic behaviours)
(see Fig. 1) will, being aversive, tend to resolve, diminish,
habituate, or extinguish if not maintained. This process
of maintenance, if it occurs at a psychological level, and
so is amenable to psychological-level intervention, is
then what ‘causes’ and defines a CPP. “Self-perpetuating
vicious circles” have been found to explain the
persistence of “symptoms” not only in grief and bereave-
ment and in PTSD, but also in anxiety states, panic syn-
dromes, obsessive problems, and depression [163].
Therefore, the essence of a CPP lies in some form of
psychological-level maintenance process. Inasmuch as a
treatment needs to address the ‘true cause’ of a CPP, the
relevant maintenance process should also indicate ap-
propriate therapeutic intervention. (See Appendix A
concerning confusion over addressing the ‘true cause’,
historical etiology, and underlying mechanism etiology).
….Discovered through functional analysis or case formulation
While many medical diagnoses point to underlying bio-
chemical or neurological mechanisms, few psychopatho-
logical ones do [23–25]. Neither do they indicate
particular psychological-level mechanisms [34, 35]. Hence,
clinical psychologists rarely find such diagnoses useful.
Instead, clinical psychologists will develop a case for-
mulation through a functional analysis of presenting
problematic behaviours, cognitions, emotions, and situa-
tions or stimuli [139, 198]. The case formulation or con-
ceptualisation “will explain the origins of the problem,
account for the maintenance of the current problem,
and make predictions about prognosis, [and] prescribe
treatment options” ([199] pp. 89–90).
Clinical psychologists, in practice, do very little diag-
nosing, but much case formulation [51, 52, 200]. Ac-
cording to Persons [201], the purpose of such a
formulation is always to direct treatment. “The case for-
mulation links the patient’s data on the one hand with
the treatment plan on the other” ([199] p. 89). Whereas
in psychiatry the interview may be mainly guided by the
DSM classification process, in clinical psychology case
formulation is an experimental hypothesis-driven pro-
cedure in pursuit of a “clinical theory” (the problem for-
mulation) that guides the therapy process [202].
Early forms of CBT tied to DSM’s diagnostic categor-
ies produced manualized protocols (‘a pill for an ill’).
Fig. 1 The Generic CBT Model, illustrating the essentialism of cyclic maintaining causal processesa. aThe open arrows represent normal material
sequential causal pathways. The filled arrows represent A effectively altering B. This, and specific and general examples of each causal arrow, and
the involvement of drug therapies, is fully described in [219].
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However, the case formulation approach has led much
more to tailored, individualized treatments based on
idiosyncratic, but evidence-based, case conceptualiza-
tions [54]. The Division of Clinical Psychology’s position
statement on functional psychiatric diagnoses recom-
mended the promotion of the use of psychological for-
mulation rather than traditional psychiatric diagnosis
([17] p. 9).
For example, CBT case formulation
Case formulations in clinical psychology are developed
within many alternative theoretical orientations. Any
new conception, and hence taxonomy, of CPPs will need
to accommodate all evidence-based models of CPPs. It
will need to be, in that sense, a meta-theory.
However, for present purposes, in our search for an es-
sence to CPPs, the process of case formulation within be-
haviour therapy and within CBT will be examined initially.
The ‘functional analytic clinical case models’ of behav-
iour therapy were developed as a clear and parsimonious
way to organize the variables and relationships in a func-
tional analysis ([139] pp.31–33). These vector-graphic rep-
resentations of variables and their functional relationships,
involving causal arrows connecting boxed or enclosed
variable labels, have proven to be an effective way to com-
municate behavioural case conceptualizations, and are
subsequently a guide to treatment decisions [203].
This technique was adopted for individual CBT case
conceptualization as well, and hence their generalized
form – CBT models of psychopathology – are also often
presented visually as vector diagrams [139] with cogni-
tive, emotional, behavioural, and environmental/situ-
ational elements connected by causal arrows, which can
mean “leads to”, “causes”, “allows”, “determines”, “in-
creases”, “affects”, “enables”, “is a result of”, or “is
dependent on” ([139] p., 32, [32] p., 459). Textbooks in
CBT are replete with these models. Because CBT case
formulations and subsequent treatments focus heavily
on maintenance processes rather than historical etio-
logical causes, almost all such models incorporate feed-
back loops, made evident by the arrows in their
diagrammatic representation.
The first highly influential such evidence-based model
of a CPP, incorporating a full feedback loop or ‘vicious cir-
cle’, was Clark’s panic cycle [204]. Many others have been
developed since directly from the empirical research, and
describing a wide range of problems, including general
emotional distress ([135] p. 44), PTSD ([205] p. 321), 180
(pp. 10–11)], panic disorder ([206] p. 109), worry (p. 79),
general anxiety ([207] p., 53, [208] p., 9), bulimia ([209] p.
19), anorexia (p. 21), social phobia ([210] p. 72), depres-
sion ([211] p.178, [212] p. 98)], OCD ([213] p., 127, [214]
p., 80, [215]), hypochondriasis ([216] p. 261), and health
anxiety ([217, 218], p., 370).
All of these models can be represented by the generic
CBT model presented in Fig. 1. This is the most advanced,
evidence-based candidate for “an alternative, universal
theory of what maintains and exacerbates psychological
distress” ([4] p. 8). The model incorporates such diverse
psychological phenomena as operant conditioning, clas-
sical conditioning, cognitive mediation, expectancy effects,
cognitive dissonance effects, psychoeducation, multimodal
therapies, and transdiagnostic therapies [219–221].
Note that Fig. 1 is of its nature a cyclic maintenance
model, not an historical etiological model. (See Appen-
dix A.) It does not specifically include a unidirectional
input causal arrow representing historical etiological fac-
tors. In CBT, historical etiology is of sufficient interest to
be included in early assessment, and in a case formula-
tion. But it rarely determines treatment, which will be
primarily dependent on identification of elements in the
maintaining causal processes [222]. Historical precipi-
tants are less treatment-relevant, less universal, and suf-
fer from the problems of multifinality and divergent
trajectories [105].
The network model
In parallel with the transdiagnostic movement, an alter-
native conceptualization of mental disorders has
emerged that does not see them as latent underlying dis-
ease entities revealed by discrete symptom sets, or as la-
bels for arbitrarily targeted sets of symptoms. McGrath
[223] has observed that theoretical terms in psychology,
such as “depression”, may often refer to a constellation
of variables, rather than to a single latent structure.
Partly in order to explain DSM’s excessive comorbidity
rates, such as between Major Depressive Disorder and
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Cramer et al. [27] have
proposed a Theory of Complex Networks, in which dis-
orders are viewed as “networks that consist of symptoms
and causal relations between them” (p. 138). In the com-
plex network approach “disorders are conceptualized as
systems of causally connected symptoms rather than as
effects of a latent disorder” ([224] p.93). The symptoms
then do not measure a disorder, they are part of it. A
disorder is thus conceptualized as “a cluster of directly
related symptoms” ([27] p.140). An example could be:
Chronic stress ➔ depressed mood ➔ self-reproach ➔ in-
somnia ➔ fatigue ➔ concentration problems ([224]
p.96). Comorbidity is then a result of direct bidirectional
relations between the symptoms of each disorder, for ex-
ample the sleep disturbance and fatigue of MDD and the
chronic worrying and difficulty concentrating of GAD
([27] p. 139).
This entirely new way to conceptualize CPPs is already
heavily research-based (e.g. [225]) engenders more useful
clinical research [224, 226], thoroughly explains comor-
bidity patterns [27, 225, 227], and is naturally compatible
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with a transdiagnostic process model of mental disorders
[79], such as that of Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins [105].
Also, psychopathology networks, unlike mental disor-
ders, can extend beyond the individual. Reciprocal inter-
actions can occur between people, as when a child’s
sleeping problems produces parental sleep problems;
both feed into behaviour problems, which then increase
parental stress, and which does no good at all for the
parents’ management of the child’s sleep problem ([224]
p.104). A notion of CPPs derived through a complex
network model can incorporate interpersonal psycho-
logical or relationship problems.
And networks – like diagrammatic case formulations
– imply intervention points. The ‘centrality’ of a symp-
tom in a network refers to how causally connected and
hence clinically relevant it is. It is recommended that
one target in therapy the most central symptoms [228].
However, the network model does not as yet offer us a
new conceptualization – a new “essence” of the common
psychological disorders [79]. Until very recently, it has
continued to view MDD and GAD as autonomous en-
tities able to receive and send out causal effects, and has
assumed the “illusion of one-way causality” between bio-
logical and behavioural levels of the system. This merely
adds a dimensional layer onto a categorical disease
model of CPPs. And has thus presented us with ‘fuzzy
boundaries’ between diagnostic categories. Cramer et al.
([27] p.183) have asserted that the difference in the net-
work model between “disorder” and “no disorder” is
how many symptoms are “on”, or how severe they are.
There are two criteria here. One would be better. And
they are both dimensional criteria. How many symptoms
need to be “on” to call a problem a CPP? And how severe
do they have to be? No essence to mental disorders is
stipulated.
This falling short (until very recently) of offering a
new conceptualization of CPPs is attributable to the net-
work approach’s assumption that mental disorders and
psychopathology arise from or result from the causal
interplay between psychopathological symptoms [227].
So in this model causal networks are explanatory and
ubiquitous, but not yet essence-defining.
Borsboom [229] and Borsboom et al. [230] have come
closer to such an essence when postulating that a com-
prehensive model of psychopathology could be devel-
oped if it is recognised that the networks’ biological,
psychological, and societal mechanisms and causal rela-
tions can be sufficiently strong to generate a level of
feedback that renders them self-sustaining in feedback
loops that become ‘stuck in a disorder state’. Borsboom
[229] describes this as a “general feature” of mental dis-
orders. If, instead, this were to be regarded as a univer-
sal, essential, and definitive feature of psychopathology,
then a true ‘paradigm shift’ would be complete.
Another major problem for clinicians with the net-
work model to date is its complexity. Not only are there
disagreements over the reliability of the general and the-
oretical results of network analysis methods (see [231]
versus [232]), but in specific analyses, Cramer et al. ([27]
p.180) admit that when etiology is conceptualized in
terms of the development of a network over time, this
can lead to enormous complexity, depends on numerous
vulnerabilities, and will vary greatly from one individual
to another. Belzung et al. [233] have pointed out that the
discernment of therapeutic targets under the network
model could be extraordinarily difficult. We are still
missing a simplifying essence to CPPs.
What if, in “defining our disorders at the level of prop-
erty clusters under-girded by dysfunctional but self-
sustaining mechanisms” ([40] p.1149), we focus on the
“self-sustaining mechanisms” (the systems or processes)
rather than the “property clusters” (the topographic
symptoms)? After all, “causal meaningful relations be-
tween symptoms…are the very stuff of which mental dis-
orders are made” ([224] p.96).
The need for a ‘linchpin’
So both the transdiagnostic movement and the network
model have moved focus from symptom measurement
and diagnosis to the case formulation of problem-
maintaining processes. But no replacement conception
and subsequent problem taxonomy or functional classifi-
cation system has yet ensued [34].
The major drawback of psychological-level case for-
mulation of CPPs when contrasted with the diagnosis of
mental disorders is that functional analyses or case for-
mulations can be complex, vague, and idiographic ([35]
p.1153). Case formulation is relatively unreliable [51].
For example, both Persons et al. [234] and Mumma and
Smith [235] have found good agreement among thera-
pists in identifying presenting problems, but poor agree-
ment in identifying hypothesized underlying cognitive
mechanisms. Eells et al. [236] reviewed intake evalua-
tions at an outpatient psychiatric clinic. They found 95%
included descriptive information, but only 43% proposed
an inferred psychological mechanism.
Superimposing a transdiagnostic dimensional model
over a categorical diagnostic nosology (e.g. [237]) merely
adds to this complexity. Functional analysis has remained
“neither specific nor replicable” ([99] p.381). But a tax-
onomy of all possible problematic cognitions, and behav-
iours, and emotions, and stimuli or triggers would be
unwieldy and arbitrary, barely explanatory, and would not
define CPPs according to one or two discernible criteria.
Therefore, what is required is some form of simplifying
“linchpin” [238] which could guide and standardise case
formulation, aid communicability through standardisation
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of nomenclature, and ultimately define the presence and
essence of CPPs.
The essence: problem-maintaining circles (PMCs)
Assembling the criteria developed thus far, the items to be
listed in the new taxonomy of CPPs must be: Problems,
formulated at a psychological level, that warrant thera-
peutic intervention, and rest on an empirically-supported,
theory-rich model, which parsimoniously and categorically
defines processes or mechanisms that exist in the real
world, are causally maintaining and hence treatment-
relevant, simplify complexity, and aid in case formulation.
It is also desirable that such listed CPPs can generate and
organize treatment-relevant research, are codifiable, will
minimize stigma, include relationship problems, and
recognize and distinguish various ‘kinds’ of problem.
So, having loosed ourselves from the conceptual mana-
cles of the mental disorder model of CPPs, we now find
the requirements imposed upon our new conception to
be much more exclusive and demanding. But one notion
can satisfy all of the above criteria…..
All clinical psychological problems are caused by PMCs
It is the claim of this Proposal that the smallest, simplest
‘unit of psychological pathology’ which fulfils all of the
above criteria is the functioning of a problem-maintain-
ing circle (PMC) of psychological-level causal elements,
several illustrations of which are presented in Fig. 2 in
the form of vector diagrams. This is the simplest, most
basic unit of a CPP expressed in evidence-based graphic
models of psychopathology, in the generic CBT model
of Fig. 1, and in the case formulations of most scientist-
practitioner or practitioner-scholar clinicians. It is the
‘linch-pin’. This causally cyclic (maintaining) mechanism
depicts the essential difference between a negative
psychological-level state of affairs (a psychological prob-
lem), and a state of affairs requiring interventive treat-
ment – a clinical psychological problem (CPP) (see
Table 1). A CPP is then any undesired, self-maintaining,
psychological-level causal cycle that involves people’s
thoughts, feelings, behaviour, and situations.
Until a full PMC forms, a negative psychological-level
state of affairs may be a problem, but it is not a ‘clinical’
problem warranting formal therapy. It can be expected
to pass, as normal, successful coping mechanisms are
employed. As soon as it becomes self-perpetuating via a
PMC, such as the use of an unsuccessful coping tech-
nique (avoidance comes to mind, or rumination, or …),
then intervention is justified. The identified mechanism
of perpetuation or maintenance will then indicate points
of intervention, and hence particular therapies.
To be upset (e.g. an acute stress reaction) is negative
and psychological, so it is a ‘psychological problem’, but
this does not warrant referral, formulation, and
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2 Examples of PMCs defining CPPs. Each is research-derived, generalized, explanatory, treatment-relevant, can be detected by a
comprehensive psychological assessment and functional analysis, and be presented in a communicable codified case formulation. (See Appendix
B for a proposed listing and coding system of such PMCs.) They exemplify PMCs within CPPs involving (a) depression, (b) a chronic pain problem,
(c) a relationship problem, and (d) a 'comorbid' social anxiety problem with a causally interrelated alcohol abuse problem
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therapeutic intervention, until it persists or becomes
self-maintaining (e.g. PTSD) through a process or mech-
anism which, when identified, can also indicate which
treatment to apply. This mechanism then is the essence
of, and defines, the CPP.
The simplest expression of a PMC would be a bidirec-
tional causal relationship between two features within
one element of the tripartite model of Fig. 1 (cognitions,
emotions, or behaviours), as when Thought A leads to
Thought B, which leads to Thought A (“I am a worthless
person” ➔ “For example, I’ve failed that exam” ➔ “See, I
am a worthless person”), or between two features in dif-
ferent elements of the tripartite model, as when Thought
A leads to Feeling X, which leads to Thought A (“Life is
awful” ➔ sadness ➔ “Life is awful”).
Since people are innately complex, many PMCs will
involve several elements of Fig. 1 before a full self-
perpetuating causal circle is completed, such as: Feel de-
pressed ➔ Do little ➔ Few achievements in life ➔ Low
confidence and self-esteem ➔ Do less ➔ Few pleasures
in life ➔ Feel depressed.
PMC formation, and the marginal relevance of historic
etiology (See Appendix A)
If a full PMC does not form, the psychological problem
(for it is still aversive, and occurring at a psychological
level) will likely resolve, remit, dissolve, or be processed.
For example, Bill and Mary have a screaming row. To-
morrow, Bill apologizes and life goes on. If, however, Bill
wakes tomorrow still angry, ignores Mary over breakfast,
she sees and resents this, there is no intimacy all week,
both blame the other, her respect for him decreases, etc.,
then one or more PMCs have formed, and the situation
qualifies as a relationship CPP which would benefit from
therapeutic intervention, as it is unlikely to spontan-
eously remit soon.
The description of a forming PMC can start at any
element of Fig. 1. For example, if someone begins to
withdraw from people (a Behaviour) – whatever the rea-
son (physical disability, poverty, illness, depressive mood,
taking on a job as a lighthouse keeper, etc.) – this can
lead to a socially impoverished lifestyle (Events, Situa-
tions), which can result in lowered social confidence and
self-esteem, and more caution, or even catastrophizing,
about people (Thoughts), which can lead to more anx-
iety in social contacts (Feelings), which naturally results
in more withdrawal (Behaviour). Which point in this se-
quence is identified as the ‘start’ of the circle is some-
what arbitrary and often marginally relevant by the time
therapy is sought. The initial precipitant is often no lon-
ger critical. But the behaviours, situations, thoughts, or
feelings that produce a maintaining cycle are.
Generally, historical etiology of a CPP is identified in
the ‘Events, Situations’ element. Common examples of
such include past traumas, parenting styles, recent trau-
mas, and stress accumulation. However, it is just as pos-
sible that ‘Feelings’ or ‘Behaviours’ or ‘Thoughts’ could
“go wrong” first. Examples could include a spontaneous
panic attack (a Feeling) leading to Panic Disorder, PTSD
that forms from an acute stress reaction due to coping
by avoidance (a Behaviour), or health anxiety that be-
comes problematic due to catastrophic thinking (a
Thought). What “went wrong” first may be important in
the prevention of CPPs, but is largely irrelevant once
PMCs have formed. This is the reason that all recom-
mended evidence-based therapies happen to focus on
problem maintainers rather than require analysis of pre-
sumed distant historical precipitants.
PMCs and treatment-relevance
The elements in a PMC can be specific, such as a par-
ticular thought, or general, as in an abiding attitude
[219]. They can be cognitive, behavioural, emotional, or
situational. Therefore each formulated PMC can impli-
cate a number of intervention points at several levels.
For example, the ‘Feel depressed’ PMC of Fig. 2(a)
may suggest interventions such as a form of cognitive
therapy (to attack the “Negative thinking” element) or
behavioural activation (to attack the “Do little” element)
or a change in circumstances (ditto re “No rewards”).
The relationship PMC of Fig. 2(c) could lead to a home-
work exercise of writing a list of the best features of your
partner (to affect the “Feel less warmth” element), or a
commitment to hug your partner three times a day (to
affect “Withhold caring behaviours”).
By definition, a PMC formulation that explains the
maintenance of a CPP must indicate at least one inter-
vention point, and hence imply a known therapeutic
procedure which targets this, or at least invite research
into effective interventions at such a point.
PMCs within and between ‘mental disorders’
A PMC taxonomy is clearly transdiagnostic. Some PMCs
occur within the symptom network [27] of what has
been traditionally regarded as a single separate distin-
guishable disorder, such as Depression, or Panic Dis-
order, or Substance Abuse. Examples of these can be
found in Fig. 2(a and b), and in the numerous vector dia-
grams of the CBT models of psychopathology listed
earlier.
However, many empirically discovered PMCs occur
between the symptom clusters of traditionally distin-
guished disorders. They involve ‘bridge symptoms’, in
network terms. Figure 2(d) is an example. It illustrates a
‘comorbidity’ explanation for Social Anxiety and Alcohol
Abuse. Such PMCs explain DSM’s high comorbidity in-
cidences. A comprehensive PMC taxonomy would in-
clude such recognized evidence-based PMCs. Among
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the most researched are the mutual relationships be-
tween anxiety and depression problems [239]. However,
new ones are constantly being discovered or confirmed,
such as a bidirectional association between depression
and sexual dysfunction [240], between cigarette smoking
and panic disorders [241], or between pain problems and
PTSD [242], and precise causal links need to be uncovered
in the search for therapeutic intervention points.
The voluminous and clinically valuable literature
uncovering causal relationships between symptoms [27],
whether they be within a cluster regarded by DSM as a
single disorder, or between such disorders, currently has
no place to be assembled and coordinated. Comorbidi-
ties are currently seen as theoretically disruptive. An
evidence-based taxonomy of PMCs will bring together
this highly therapeutically relevant information in a clin-
ically useful way.
Fast and slow PMCs
The PMC model of CPPs replaces the seven-or-more cri-
teria for the existence of a mental disorder found in DSM,
with one criterion: Has a psychological-level PMC
formed? The nearest DSM criterion to this is duration of
the problem. However, this is an inadequate criterion be-
cause the complexity of life means that some PMCs can
form and warrant intervention in days, and some do not
cement for months, even years. Sleep problems deserving
of psychological-level intervention can form in days. If a
person has a disrupted night for any reason, and then is
kept awake by the anxious anticipation of another terrible
night, a PMC has formed in 2–3 nights that can perpetu-
ate or even spiral. Intervention to break this PMC may be
warranted and successful even on Night 2.
On the other hand, the cognitive, affective, and behav-
ioural changes that are expected, and possibly necessary,
after the death of one’s lifelong spouse may persist for a
year or longer, during which time a clinician would be
loath to interfere lest the bereaved’s natural coping and
recovery processes be disrupted ([174] p.140). This is
due to the prolonged natural course of such grief reac-
tions. Counseling support may be offered, but this is
supportive and guiding rather than interventive of some
‘pathology’. It will understandably take a long time to be
sure of, and intervene with, any PMC explaining the on-
set of a prolonged grieving/depression CPP.
The need for a new taxonomy of clinical
psychological problems
When the subject matter of a scientific discipline has
been determined and defined, the process of study will
begin descriptively, with systematic observation and list-
ings [4]. From such activity universal principles, pro-
cesses, and concepts are developed which comprise the
discipline’s scientific theories. A core element of such
theories has been the listings and classifications of their
subject matter – the taxonomies – that each scientific
enterprise has developed.
“A reliable system of classification is important for the
advancement of a clinical science” ([243] p. 386) because
this process within the scientific method subsequently be-
comes circular, such that discovered general principles,
processes, and concepts then guide further observations,
research, experiment, and classification ([5] p. 13). What
is listed and classified – the subject matter of the discip-
line – is therefore critical to the advancement of the scien-
tific enterprise, because all subsequent research is
dependent upon it. We do not observe and experiment in
a vacuum. What we seek and how we incorporate what
we find is dependent upon our frame of reference. “Ex-
periment is planned action in which every step is guided
by theory” ([244] p. 280). “Our observational experiences
are…impregnated with theories” (p. 111).
Therefore, the development of the most appropriate
taxonomy of CPPs is essential for progress in clinical
psychology to enable research to produce general laws
and rules, to provide a common language for the reliable
assessment of problems, to simplify communication, to
codify problems for third-party payers, to enable rele-
vant reliable research conclusions, to suggest problem
causes, to optimize and tailor treatments, as well as to
develop new ones, to inform and ease the minds of suf-
ferers, and to organize access to services, benefits, or
support groups [14, 53]. All of these functions have been
performed for clinical psychology – though generally
poorly – by psychiatry’s DSM, which has dominated in
the administrative functions of billing and coding, insur-
ance and service funding models, clinical communica-
tion, and research funding and approvals [101, 245].
But it has done this poorly because, though greater
specificity and description of symptoms at a phenom-
enological level has at least given us a common language
that can be applied with reasonably good interrater reli-
ability [21, 246, 247], becoming more atheoretical to
achieve greater reliability in diagnosis has sacrificed al-
most all claims to validity [248]. Psychiatry has tried to
become tighter, stricter, and more precise at identifying
made-up mental disorders.
While the British DCP has been calling for a con-
ceptual paradigm shift [17], across the Atlantic the
American Psychological Association has formally
expressed concerns that DSM-5’s (re)development is
not benefiting psychological treatment outcomes [11],
and the president of the Association for Behavioral
and Cognitive Therapies has advocated for a new
cognitive-behavioural classification system for mental
disorders [53]. (Note that, until a conceptual para-
digm shift occurs, this proposal is still about “mental
disorders” rather than CPPs.)
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The current state of psychological science has been
compared to that of physics 200–300 years ago, in that,
despite voluminous research over the past 60 or so years,
it is still plagued by theoretical disunity, which is largely a
consequence of the non-standardized use of terms by re-
searchers and clinicians in their theoretical orientation
silos [249]. This disunity is reflected in an absence of clin-
ical psychology’s own general taxonomy of CPPs.
As with clinical psychology’s own conception of CPPs,
the nature of its own taxonomy of CPPs can be derived
from: (1) DSM’s inadequacies; And (2) clinical psycholo-
gists’ natural taxonomic focus and categories.
With regard to (1) DSM’s taxonomic inadequacies for
clinical psychology, all of the problems with DSM’s con-
ception of CPPs apply to its taxonomy. Its items (mental
disorders) are conceptually biologically based, not
psychological-level processes. They have no psycho-
logical (or even biological) essence, and so definition and
classification are only descriptive, not explanatory, and
diagnosis is minimally treatment-indicative.
Due to its medical model basis, DSM diagnosis does
not even tell us when to intervene medically (e.g.
pharmacologically) and when to intervene at a psycho-
logical level (e.g. with a CBT), let alone whether to inter-
vene psychologically by first addressing a person’s
situation, and/or their thinking patterns, and/or their be-
haviour, and /or their feelings states.
Furthermore, several types of CPPs (e.g. marital prob-
lems) are not included. The stigma of a DSM diagnosis
of ‘mental illness’ is barely less than that of ascribing
moral weakness or sinfulness or demonic possession.
And research based on DSM categories has not been
able to find systematic or explanatory links between psy-
chosocial treatments and problem types. These are the
problems that a new PMC-based classification of CPPs
must, and can, overcome.
Further, a new taxonomy of CPPs, based on a new con-
ception of CPPs, must be: (a) an aid to case formulation,
case conceptualization, or the functional analysis of behav-
iour; (b) a listing of processes or mechanisms, rather than
states, conditions, or diseases; (c) a recognition of and dis-
tinction between various conceptual kinds of psychological
problem, such as between ‘clinical’ versus ‘normal’, ‘psycho-
pathological’ versus ‘psychological’, ‘organically-based’ versus
‘functional’, etc. (d) relevant to (psychological-level) treat-
ment choice; and (e) usable in place of diagnostic groupings
in research on psychotherapy outcomes.
With regard to (2) clinical psychologists’ natural taxo-
nomic focus and categories:
Kinds of psychological problems
As the currently proposed taxonomy is to be radically
treatment-relevant, both the categories within the
taxonomy (which treatment for which CPP?) and the
borders of the taxonomy (when is treatment warranted?
when is it ‘clinical’?) must be defined by this criterion.
Thus far CPPs have been distinguished from other psy-
chological problems (Table 1) by the presence or oper-
ation of treatment-warranting PMCs. Other (transitory)
psychological problems, such as an anxious state or a
crisis situation, may benefit from support, guidance, or
information, as this can facilitate an expected adjust-
ment/recovery process. But interventive (clinical) ther-
apy is not indicated. The PMC model provides a useful
distinction between the concepts of supportive “counsel-
ling” and interventive “therapy”.
Psychopathological problems
But within the class of intervention-justifying, PMC-
involving CPPs, surely there are different ‘kinds’ of CPPs,
including ones for which psychological-level, PMC-
breaking treatments are not the first-line, or best prac-
tice, or most empirically supported interventions. For
example, are some problems still best regarded as ‘men-
tal disorders’? These are likely to be problems primarily
maintained by circumstances other than psychological-
level PMCs, such as biochemical-level problems.
A clear candidate for a distinction between differing
kinds of CPPs, that has theoretical and treatment-
relevant underpinnings, lies in the distinction between
predominantly organic (neurological-level) and predom-
inantly functional (psychological-level) problems. “The
current classification systems are less controversial for
conditions with an identified biological aetiology such as
in the fields of neuropsychology, dementias, and moder-
ate to severe learning disability” ([17] p.2).
Because biochemistry underlies all psychological activ-
ity (all of Fig. 1) [14], it has been assumed that biological
layers or levels of analysis have intrinsic causal priority
[79]; that genes affect brain activity, which affects behav-
iour. This assumption underlies the medical model of
CPPs. But we know from innumerable examples that the
causal flow goes in all directions between these levels.
For example, changes in brain PET scan images of suf-
ferers of OCD show the same effects after successful
CBT treatment as after successful pharmacotherapy
[250, 251]. Increases in testosterone levels can increase
aggressive behaviour, but inducing aggressive behaviour
can increase testosterone levels [252]. Childhood emo-
tional maltreatment has been associated with a decrease
in medial prefrontal cortex volume years later [253]. But
treatment of these effects in adulthood is still best
undertaken at a psychological level, which presumably
will alter the underlying neurology.
We are dealing here simply with different levels of
analysis. So far, brain scans have told us little new
clinically and nothing new philosophically [56]. All
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subsequent pronouncements have thus far been “neuro-
logisms” [254], meaninglessly adding "neuro-‘ to what-
ever term is being claimed to be more ‘real’ than before
we imaged the concurrent neural activity. Human
thought and action unfold at a number of explanatory
levels and we can gather different insights at different
levels of analysis ([56] p.xvii). “The view that human ex-
perience and behavior can best be explained from the
predominant or even exclusive perspective of the brain”
is an example of “neurocentrism” ([56] p.xix).
It is the clinical utility of the candidate levels of analysis
and of intervention that should determine whether a
problem is best regarded as a ‘psychopathological prob-
lem’ or a CPP. Therefore, are there problems that are bet-
ter considered – either in therapeutic terms or in
explanatory-mechanism terms – as essentially organically-
based rather than entirely PMC-driven? Haslam [62] has
argued that there are. He cites as examples autism and
schizotypal personality. These problems may be blurred
by threshold effects and multiple causal factors, but they
have relatively non-arbitrary boundaries, and underlying
causal mechanisms have been proposed that are not en-
tirely psychological-level.
Further examples of problems that are difficult to ac-
count for in a purely symptom-network model [27] in-
clude schizophrenia in remission, ADHD when behaviour
is controlled in a specific environment, and delusional dis-
order. Hood and Lovett [255] argue that the underlying
disorder in these cases is latent or silent. Rubinsten and
Henik [256] have added mathematical disorder, reading
disorder/dyslexia, and developmental dyscalculia as almost
certainly examples of the expression of underlying brain
dysfunctions.
From a treatment perspective, some problems respond
better to pharmacotherapy than to psychotherapy. For
example, APA’s [257] practice guidelines for the
treatment of patients with schizophrenia are predomin-
antly pharmacological. Medication is considered first-
line treatment for schizophrenia [258], and concurrent
psychosocial interventions are “almost always offered
adjunctively to pharmacotherapy” ([134] p.292). This
treatment-relevance confers some clinical utility upon
the DSM diagnosis of schizophrenic disorders [243].
Therefore, although CBT-based family therapy and
stress management have been found to reduce the inci-
dence of readmission with schizophrenia [134, 259–262],
neither of these approaches is expected to ‘cure’ the condi-
tion, or to optimally manage the problem when used ex-
clusively, whereas psychotherapy with most anxiety or
depression problems is. CBT is not first-line therapy for
schizophrenia because more than psychological-level
PMCs seem to be operating.
Therefore, PMC theory seeks to distinguish problems
best regarded as psychological-level, or psychopatho-
logical, or psychiatric, or neurological, or sociological,
and so on, and promotes concept definition and an ap-
propriate problem taxonomy at each relevant level.
Another consequence is that the common language of
‘mental health’ services is anticipated to remain that of
‘mental disorders’. This conception has dominated for a
long time, and is arguably the most appropriate for a
substantial portion of people’s problems. PMC theory
and its conception of CPPs is likely to remain an add-
itional, concordant, and complementary body of con-
cepts and therapy-relevant taxonomy.
Type I, II, and III psychological problems
Table 2 distinguishes three types or kinds of psycho-
logical problem within the PMC model. Type I psycho-
logical problems are aversive, undesired, negative, or
dysfunctional psychological-level states of affairs that are
very common, expected, normal, transitional, ‘non-
Table 2 ‘Kinds’ of psychological problems
TYPE I General Psychological Problems TYPE II Clinical Psychological Problems (CPPs) TYPE III Psychopathological Problems
(Mental Disorders)
Normal ‘linear’ psychological reactions. Persistent undesired psychological reactions. Diagnosable psychopathologic conditions.
No PMCs identified (yet?). PMCs have formed. Breaking psychological PMCs may not be enough.
Biological PMCs may also be operating.
Refer for counseling? Refer for clinical psychological therapy. Refer for psychiatric (and psychological?) therapy.
Grief reactions
▪ Acute stress disorder
▪ Anxiety states





▪ Anxiety disorders (Panic disorder, Specific phobias, …)
▪ Depression
▪ Feeding or eating disorders
▪ Obsessive-Compulsive or Related Disorders
▪ Sexual problems






▪ Prolonged Grief Disorder
▪ Schizophrenia
▪ Schizoaffective disorder
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clinical’, probably adaptive, have not formed PMCs, and
may benefit from counseling-level support. Type II psy-
chological problems are CPPs in which one or more
PMCs are operating. They are unlikely to remit spontan-
eously, or transition easily, and clinical intervention is
warranted and likely to be effective. Type III psycho-
logical problems are those negative psychological-level
states of affairs in which the breaking of psychological-
level PMCs is unlikely to be sufficient to achieve nor-
mality, and neurophysiological-level mechanisms are
likely to be the primary maintainers to the problem.
They may be regarded as essentially ‘psychopathological’.
It must be noted that these two criteria - likely mech-
anism and first-line therapy - are not always consistent
with each other. There are some Type III conditions for
which the current best practice treatments are psycho-
therapies, simply due to the lack of advancement in the
biochemical or neuropsychological understanding and
control of the problem. Examples.
would include DSM’s Premenstrual Dysphoric Dis-
order, which, though assumed to have an organic basis,
is better ameliorated by CBT [263–265] than by
pharmacotherapy [266, 267]. Menopausal symptoms
have the same standing [268, 269], as does Chronic Fa-
tigue Syndrome [270–272], and the research and treat-
ment guidelines are not consistent with regard to
ADHD [273–275].
It is quite possible that problems will move between
Types II and III classifications as psychological-level or
neural-level underlying mechanisms are discovered and
new treatments are developed. Again, though, these two
criteria are separable. For example, neural mechanisms
underlying OCD and PTSD are being uncovered [276–
278], but subsequent treatments have not ensued, and
for now both problems are clearly in the Type II cat-
egory on the level-of-treatment criterion. This may be
different in 30 years’ time.
Kinds of (type II) clinical psychological problems
The DSM, being based on an atheoretical pragmatic
model, both poorly defines the limits of its taxonomy
(What is a mental disorder and what is not?), and arbi-
trarily categorizes its contents (What are the ‘kinds’ of
mental disorder?). The lack of a defining essence to
mental disorders means that, unlike the PMC-based dis-
tinction between mundane psychological problems
(Type I) and CPPs (Type II), the DSM does not tell us
when to treat.
But within its taxonomy DSM also regards all of the
following as examples of the one ‘kind’ of thing: A be-
reavement reaction, a spider phobia, OCD, antisocial
personality disorder, schizophrenia, autism, and frontal
lobe syndrome. They are all equally ‘mental disorders’.
This absence of theoretical discrimination spreads the
stigma of mental illness widely, gives no guide to subse-
quent treatment, or to research direction, and results in
unending disagreement as to kinds, categories, or classes
of problems, meaning that each iteration, up to and in-
cluding DSM-5, has announced major reorganizations of
internal structure.
The ultimate goal of classification is its connection
with treatment [21, 35, 279]. The proposed content of
the new taxonomy of CPPs – indeed the very definition
and essence of CPPs (i.e. PMCs) – has been determined
primarily by the criterion of treatment relevance.
However, treatment relevance is only one element of
the clinical utility of a taxonomic listing. Clinicians will
use a taxonomy of CPPs for other purposes such as in-
put to case formulation, for administrative, insurance, or
legalistic purposes, to assist in communicating clinical
information, the use of categories in clinical practice,
and predicting future clinical management needs ([280]
p.947). A taxonomy will be judged according to its man-
ageability, practicality, and conformance with logical and
intuitive conceptualization [280].
If classification within the taxonomy were to be ac-
cording solely to specific treatment implications, this
would result in categories such as “Problems treatable
by exposure therapy” or “CPPs for which thought stop-
ping is frequently a useful adjunct”. Such categories
would be large, unwieldy, highly overlapping, and coun-
terintuitive. Also, this would be a reversion to the med-
ical model ‘pill for an ill’ or ‘Condition X therefore
Treatment Y’ approach, rather than increasing the rate,
reliability, and communicability of case formulation and
subsequent tailored treatment programs.
The phenomena of divergent trajectories and multifin-
ality [105] mean that several evidence-based therapies
may be helpful for a particular problem situation, and
that a particular therapy may be effective for several dif-
fering problems. This is entirely consistent with the suc-
cess of transdiagnostic therapy programs and with PMC
theory, in which each PMC has several elements – all
possible intervention points – and any one element (e.g.
hypervigilance) can feature in several different PMCs.
The elements within a PMC can be specific (e.g. a
thought) or general (e.g. an attitude). They can be cogni-
tive, behavioural, emotional, or situational. Therefore
each PMC can implicate a number of intervention
points at several levels. The number of identified trans-
diagnostic processes implicating different transdiagnostic
therapies is already very large [4]. And some modes of
intervention, such as attention-based treatments, have
been found to be useful for a large number of CPPs
[281]. Grouping by specific intervention is not intuitive
for clinicians [282, 283].
DSM has been criticized for ignoring the spontaneous
consensus models of the clinical community [284].
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Extensive studies of the conceptual taxonomies of clini-
cians have found that they do not match those of DSM
or of ICD-10 in structure [282, 283, 285–289].
The ‘folk taxonomies’ of eclectic clinicians are quite
consistent across theoretical orientations and professions
[288, 289], and are guided by several aspects of clinical
utility [280]. Usually included are mood disorders (ex-
cluding bipolar and cyclothymic), anxiety disorders, sub-
stance abuse disorders, eating disorders, externalizing
childhood disorders, developmental disabilities, schizo-
phrenia, and dependent and paranoid personality disor-
ders [283]. Experienced clinicians group together
anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, as well as sub-
stance dependence with substance abuse, conduct dis-
order with oppositional defiant disorder, panic disorder
with phobias and GAD, and mental retardation with aut-
ism [285]. Psychiatrists have been found to prefer fewer
categories, and with flexible (ICD-11-type) guidance ra-
ther than strict criteria-based diagnoses [287]. The same
preference for (ICD-11-type) flexible guidelines over
(DSM-5-like) strict criteria has been found among psy-
chologists [290]. Such classifications are generally prag-
matic, and based on ‘presenting problem’.
When PMCs are grouped under presenting problems
such as ‘Depression’ or ‘Anger problems’ [219], then
homework sheets covering possibly relevant PMCs can be
easily selected and tailored. “Some nomothetic conceptual
overlay is necessary as an initial guide to the more in-
depth process of individual functional analysis because it
defines the domain of interest” ([99] p.380). Such categor-
ies are not formal diagnoses. Denman [291] has pointed
out that case formulations will inevitably have ‘diagnostic
elements’ in them, but not in a mental disorder/DSM
sense. For example, “the problem is ‘marital in nature’” is
a form of diagnosis and a useful label when formulating a
person’s problems to determine treatment [52], so ‘marital’
or ‘relationship’ categories of PMCs would be clinically
useful, but not as de facto DSM diagnoses.
The HiTOP consortium [49] has revealed a transdiag-
nostic, empirically-derived, hierarchical dimensional
model of classification of mental disorders. Its broader
dimensions (‘spectra’, such as an internalizing dimension)
correspond in PMC theory to PMCs that operate among
many, or even most, of our clientele. For example: ‘De-
velop a CPP ➔ Feel out of control ➔ Lowered self-
efficacy feelings ➔ CPP is perpetuated.’ ([219] p.30.)
Such broad, generic, near-universal PMCs deserve a cat-
egory to themselves, as do the broader HiTOP dimen-
sions. (This category is labelled “PMCs 11.y.z Any
Psychological Problem” in Table 3 in Appendix B.)
Therefore, it is proposed that PMCs be grouped in the
new CPP taxonomy for clinical utility under generally-
accepted well-understood presenting problem headings
such as ‘Anxiety problems’, ‘Depression’, ‘Relationship
problems’, ‘Eating/Weight Problems’, and ‘Substance
abuse/dependence’.
A proposed classification and coding system
A nascent micro classification system of PMCs is already
in clinical use and is taught in several postgraduate clin-
ical programs [220, 221]. However, this listing is ad hoc,
idiosyncratic, and unlikely in such an embryonic state to
provide codings that would achieve broad acceptance.
An effort by teams of clinicians and researchers corre-
sponding to some meaningful fraction of the effort de-
voted to the development of the DSMs, is required to
construct a systematic, exhaustive, and evidence-based
taxonomy of CPPs in the form of distinct, identifiable
PMCs. “One can only speculate how fruitful psycho-
logical research would prove to be were decades of the
financial and head-space resources devoted to biological
research…available to psychology” ([292] p.738).
However, in the interim, a proposed classification and
coding system is presented in Appendix B. It proposes
three-level numerical coding of the format “PMC x.y.z”
in which ‘x’ codes represent presenting problems (e.g. de-
pression), including Type III psychological problems
(e.g. schizophrenia), and ‘Interactive clinical psychological
problems’, currently labelled as ‘comorbid conditions’ (e.g.
chronic pain & anxiety). Then ‘y’ codes represent the
major classes of problematic underlying maintaining
mechanisms commonly identified in several presenting
problems (e.g. hypervigilance). And ‘z’ codes represent
specific evidence-based mechanisms which imply specific
treatment approaches (e.g. behavioural avoidance).
For example, the PMCs illustrated in Fig. 2 would code
as: (a) PMC 2.2.3 (A depression problem maintained by
negative thinking, which may benefit from Cognitive
Therapy.) (b) PMC 6.1.3 (A persistent pain problem
maintained by behavioural avoidance.) (c) PMC 3.5.3 (A
relationship problem reinforced by ongoing mutual dis-
like/disrespect.) and (d) PMC 13.6.1 (An interactive
problem in which coping by using alcohol maintains a
tendency to social anxiety.)
Such a framework can systematically summarize
and stimulate the currently disparate streams of
research on assessment, case formulation, and
therapeutic intervention in clinical psychology. For
example, instead of assessing the efficacy of a particu-
lar Cognitive Therapy package in helping a diagnostic-
ally uniform (but psychologically heterogeneous)
sample of sad people, subjects could be selected based
upon identification, through an assessment and case
formulation, of the presence or functioning of PMC
2.2.3 above. Such would be infinitely more logical,
and just as methodologically sound in a randomized
controlled trial.
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The PMC model is a metatheory
CBT’s substantial evidence base, and its inherent em-
phasis on here-and-now case formulations and thera-
peutic disruption of problem maintainers, make it a
natural fit for the PMC model of CPPs. For example, the
dimensional models being developed by the HiTOP
consortium are particularly compatible with CBT ap-
proaches [120]. They are both evidence-based, empiric-
ally inclined, and transdiagnostic, and HiTOP’s
dimensions are very useful in CBT formulations [159].
However PMC theory is not specific to a CBT view of
the world. The Complex Network Model of CPPs, which
PMC theory has grown from, “does not involve the ac-
ceptance of any particular theory about psychopath-
ology” ([224] p.96). HiTOP’s models are “theoretically
agnostic” [120]. Theorists and practitioners from a range
of orientations have identified and targeted ‘vicious cir-
cles’ or ‘vicious cycles’ as a core feature of their concep-
tion of CPPs. Only the nature and level of causal
elements within their formulated PMCs vary.
For example, the movement toward integration of
models of psychotherapy [293, 294], has frequently
pointed to cyclic processes between internal (psycho-
dynamic) states and external (cognitive-behavioral)
events [295]. Reciprocal, cyclic, self-perpetuating pro-
cesses have a “pervasive role” in psychoanalytic,
cognitive-behavioral, systemic, and experiential models
of psychopathology [296].
Within the psychodynamic model the type of problem
or disorder can be gleaned by content, but the presence
of a disorder can be determined by “cyclic psychody-
namics” [297–299]. Narcissistic personality disorder, for
example, can be understood purely intrapsychically and/
or as an environmentally-maintained disposition in
which “what makes them continue to feel bad is how
they go about trying to feel better” ([295] p.52). Short-
term existential interventions have been explained as
ways to break vicious circles of emotion [300].
Family systems theorists have long emphasised cyclical
formulations with psychodynamic elements [301]. In-
deed they have promoted this focus on ‘circular causal
loops’ in problem formulations – as opposed to linear
psychodynamic cause and effect explanations – as a
‘new epistemology’ [302].
Nor is defining the essence of a clinical problem in
terms of vicious circles or PMCs particular to clinical
psychology. It has been proposed or enacted within fo-
rensic psychology [303, 304], organizational psychology
[305], and crossculturally [306]. Much of medicine de-
scribes vicious circles of organic pathology (fever, organ
failure, etc.) treated by intervening in biochemical PMCs.
For example, many neurodegenerative diseases are now
understood in terms of “cascades” of “proteinopathies”
within or affecting neurons [307].
Therefore, theorists and researchers from many theor-
etical orientations are able to contribute, and to utilize,
the new taxonomy, only providing that the focus is on
problem maintenance, and the relevant PMCs and im-
plied treatments are evidence-based.
Advantages of a PMC taxonomy for clinical
psychologists
A PMC taxonomy overcomes almost all of the problems
clinical psychologists have with DSM. Its only compara-
tive drawback is its relative complexity. But we have
seen that, for clinical psychologists, DSM’s simplicity has
been gained at an unacceptable cost to its validity and
clinical utility. Life is complex. People are complex. And
DSM has oversimplified them.
Unlike DSM, a PMC taxonomy does not claim that
the items it lists are inherently negative. It simply lists
discovered cyclic causal sequences. Whether they are
viewed as desirable or undesirable is a value judgement.
There are as many ‘virtuous circles’ as there are ‘vicious
circles’. DSM’s controversial conceptual overreach in
asserting that, for example, homosexuality or Female Or-
gasmic Disorder are inherently negative (because they
are “mental disorders”) is thus avoided.
Psychologists do not simply attempt to alter states or
reduce ‘symptoms’. They do not merely work to cheer
up a sad person or to relax an anxious person. The PMC
taxonomy lists problematic ongoing underlying mecha-
nisms or processes that must be addressed. DSM’s prob-
lems with multifinality and divergent trajectories are also
thus overcome.
A PMC taxonomy defines and lists clinical psycho-
logical problems as perpetuating cyclic processes. This
simple intuitive concept at once confers an essence to
CPPs, that is parsimonious (one criterion, not seven or
eight), categorical not dimensional, and has intrinsic
clinical utility and treatment-relevance.
CPPs, as defined within the PMC model, qualify as es-
sential entities on the eight criteria of such proposed by
Haslam and Ernst [8]. The identification of a depression
PMC is informative. It tells us much about the person
involved. Anxiety PMCs are historically invariant. We
know of phobic PMCs from Roman times. Such prob-
lems are discrete. There are definable boundaries. They
are uniform. People trapped in eating problem PMCs
have many similarities. They are, by definition, immut-
able. They rarely spontaneously remit. There is one ne-
cessary feature (a full causal PMC). They are inherent;
there is a sameness under the symptoms. And they are
natural, and not simply an artificial product of people’s
efforts to classify made-up mental disorders.
A PMC taxonomy is theory-based, be this PMC theory
or evidence-based clinical theory. But, given the cyclic
nature of scientific research and theory construction, the
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taxonomy can improve the focus and organisation of re-
search efforts, and the reporting and assemblage of re-
search results.
The proposed PMC coding system can communicate
more psychologically-relevant and treatment-relevant in-
formation than can DSM’s. “Bill Bloggs has been experien-
cing PMCs 2.3.1 and 2.4.1 for approximately 6 months” is
much more psychologically informative – it tells us much
more about what has gone wrong and what to do about it
– than “Bill Bloggs has been suffering a Major Depressive
Disorder for approximately 6 months”.
Communicability will be enhanced not only among
clinical psychologists. The medical model and PMC the-
ory are compatible and complementary. Already, clinical
psychologists accept referrals of diagnosed mental disor-
ders, understand what is meant, do their own functional
analyses and case formulations, and often feed these
back to the psychiatric or physician referrer, who under-
stands them perfectly well, and may even appreciate a
PMC code summary of this formulation.
A taxonomy of PMCs can increase the reliability of
case formulation as well as its communicability through
standardization of nomenclature. A PMC-based model is
also very comprehensible and communicable to clients.
Quite complex graphically presented individual case for-
mulations can be simplified, standardized, and described
by separating out the individual PMCs involved.
A person who is offered a PMC-based case formula-
tion of their CPP with its explained mechanisms, treat-
ment implications, openings for self-help, and overlap
with normality is likely to find this more comprehen-
sible, more optimistic, more empowering, and less stig-
matizing than being conferred with a diagnosis of a
psychopathology or mental disorder.
Within the model different ‘kinds’ of psychological
problem are recognised and operationally defined (see
Table 2). New useful meaning is then conferred on terms
such as “counselling”, “intervention”, “therapy”, and
“psychopathological”.
CPPs that do not conveniently fit the mould of mental
disorders, such as relationship problems, or that cross the
artificial borders of separate mental disorders, such as ‘agi-
tated depression’ or alcohol abuse triggered by and perpetu-
ating social anxiety, are fully recognised in a PMC
taxonomy. Comorbidity is no longer a theoretical quandary.
But does a PMC taxonomy work better?!
However, as the primary criterion for any clinical tax-
onomy is its treatment-relevance [21, 31, 99, 279], the
real test of PMC theory is whether it results in more
treatment success.
As research around the world has been so completely
dominated by the mental disorder model, it is hard to
find exceptions in which problem assessment and
assessment of improvement are based on a case formu-
lation rather than a diagnosis, let alone comparisons of
the two approaches with the same population. Among
the few that have been undertaken, the results are clear.
This has been true for behavioural therapies based on
functional analyses, and then more recently CBT based
on case conceptualizations.
With behavioural interventions firstly, Carr and Dur-
and [308] found that the treatment of disruptive behav-
iour needed to depend on the function it was serving
(its maintainer) – whether the behaviour serves an es-
cape function or an attention-seeking function. Durand
and Crimmins [309] found that the successful treatment
of self-injurious behaviour also depended upon analysis
and discrimination as to whether it was maintained by
an attention-getting motivation, or was escape-
maintained, tangibly-maintained, or sensory-maintained.
Schneider and Bryne [310] produced a significantly
greater boost in observed social skills and cooperative
play among children with various behaviour problems
when treatment was individualized rather than standard-
ized. In a post hoc analysis, Eifert et al. [151] discovered
that their agoraphobic clients who had by chance found
themselves in the treatment condition that happened to
target their particular agoraphobic maintenance mech-
anism (fear of separation, fear of embarrassment,….) did
better. Iwata et al. [311] showed that the outcome of
treatment of self-injurious behaviour can depend on de-
tection and targeting of the specific factors maintaining
the behaviour, not on which diagnosis subsumes it.
Unfortunately, at about the same time that functional
analysis or case formulation was being imported to CBT
from behavioural analysis [312], the promotion of DSM’s
diagnostic hegemony was occurring. Despite this, some
comparisons of case conceptualization-based treatments
– where a case formulation is “a hypothesis about trans-
diagnostic mechanisms that cause and maintain all of the
patient’s symptoms and problems” ([313] p.455) – with
diagnosis-guided treatment have been undertaken. Inter-
est in such comparisons persisted because “flexible modu-
lar treatment is closer to how clinicians actually work than
are the EST protocols that target a single disorder with an
inflexible series of interventions” ([313] p.456).
For example, Jacobson et al. [314], comparing struc-
tured marital therapy with a clinically flexible version,
found that couples treated with the strictly structured
format had deteriorated significantly more at 6 month
followup.
When Litt et al. [315] compared a coping skills-based,
individualized assessment and treatment program for al-
cohol dependence problems with a CBT packaged pro-
gram, the former resulted in higher rates of abstinence
and more reports of in vivo “momentary coping re-
sponses”. In a similar vein, when the reasons for drug
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use are analysed so that brief coping skills interventions
can be matched to personality-specific motives (PMCs) for
the substance abuse, treatment efficacy is improved [316].
Persons et al. [317] demonstrated that patients with “mul-
tiple comorbidities” especially benefit when empirically sup-
ported treatment selection is guided by a case formulation.
In one of the few direct comparison treatment studies,
Weisz et al. [318] have found that utilizing a decision
flow chart with a modular approach to therapy for chil-
dren with anxiety, depression, or conduct problems
(MATCH) produced significantly quicker improvement
than standard treatment, which did not differ signifi-
cantly from usual care [319].
Also, internet-delivered guided self-help treatment of de-
pression that is individually-tailored has been found more
effective with more depressed subjects, and with higher ‘co-
morbidity’ subjects than non-tailored standardized treat-
ment or an active (online discussion) control group [320].
Fairburn et al.’s [321] transdiagnostic theory of the
maintenance of all eating disorders claims that ‘bulimia
nervosa’, anorexia nervosa’, and ‘atypical eating disorders’
share similar maintaining pathological processes (or
PMCs, see Appendix B). So, when they added four more
maintaining mechanisms to their model (e.g. concerning
mood intolerance, or core low self-esteem) they were pro-
posing four more evidence-based PMCs for the eating
problems category of our new taxonomy. It is unsurpris-
ing then when Ghaderi [322] found that individualized
CBT guided by functional analyses produces better results
with ‘bulimia nervosa’ clients than standardized focused
CBT, including in terms of percentage of nonresponders.
So, when case formulations are used to guide treatment
rather than clumsy, theory-bereft diagnoses, indications to
date are that the subsequent tailored treatments improve
our effectiveness. The next step appears to be to improve
the reliability, standardization, and validity of case formu-
lation and treatment selection by basing therapeutic trials
and outcome studies on PMC-defined rather than DSM-
diagnosed experimental groups.
Conclusions and implications
The Division of Clinical Psychology of the British Psy-
chological Society is one of many bodies that now
“believes there is a clear rationale and need for a paradigm
shift in relation to functional psychiatric diagnoses” ([17]
p.5). However, to date, no universal, radical, cohesive alter-
native to DSM or ICD for psychologists has arisen.
It is proposed that the next logical step in the scientific
development of the discipline of clinical psychology is
the formation and dissemination of a taxonomy of CPPs
based on its own conceptual scheme and operating pri-
marily at a psychological level. The independent concep-
tual, research, and clinical development of the profession
has advanced sufficiently for this critical step. In fact, it
is overdue; seemingly delayed by the hegemony of another
profession’s corresponding taxonomy – psychiatry’s nos-
ology of mental disorders. Benefits to the interactive
process of theory development, empirical research, and
clinical practice (itself a ‘virtuous circle’) will ensue.
The proposed taxonomy comprises a listing of
psychological-level problem-maintaining circles (PMCs)
that distinguish and explain the critical difference be-
tween transient, linear, negative psychological (cognitive,
emotional, behavioural, situational) events, states, reac-
tions, or experiences (Type I psychological problems),
self-perpetuating psychological-level causal loops (CPPs)
that warrant, and can be affected by, psychological-level
therapeutic intervention (Type II), and problems that
can persist even when psychological-level maintainers
are nullified (Type III ‘psychopathological problems’).
The development of the various iterations of the DSM
has involved the assignment and coordination of vast
numbers of contributors, panels, committees, and task
forces. For example, three of the five volumes of the
DSM-IV Sourcebook [323] alone commissioned 150 re-
views of the literature on psychological disorders. How-
ever, these reviews were based on research that was
conducted largely within the DSM framework, so much
circular reasoning occurred, and alternative approaches
or conceptualizations were not considered [31]. Further,
DSM’s broadly atheoretical approach has made it very
difficult, some say impossible, for it to select, interpret,
condense, confirm, and incorporate much of the re-
search its panels review. It is a very leaky virtuous circle.
To illustrate the problem at a conceptual level, there is
no evidence that the psychopathological condition/men-
tal disorder/mental illness called “Social Anxiety Dis-
order (Social Phobia)” (DSM300.23) actually exists.
There are no reliable or validated biological markers or
criteria or measures outside clinical psychological judge-
ment that can detect this ‘illness’. It is defined by its ef-
fects, which are attributed to its existence [52]. It is an
assumption – a convention – constructed for pragmatic,
sociological, or political reasons, just as the disease
model of alcohol problems and the chemical imbalance
theory of depression were. They were developed in an
attempt to reduce stigma or encourage people to take
their antidepressants. But no evidence supportive of
their veracity has emerged since. In fact, some highly
deleterious effects on self-esteem, self-efficacy, confi-
dence in treatment, and expectation of recovery have en-
sued [324]. (Ironically, a diagnosis can thus become a
self-fulfilling prophecy, and cause negative feelings,
thoughts, or behaviour via vicious circles, such as
through instilling shame or hopelessness ([14] p.69).)
On the other hand, bountiful supportive evidence has
emerged for the real-world existence and operation of
the psychological-level PMC: Excessive, problematic
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social anxiety ➔ Overly negative evaluation of one’s so-
cial performance ➔ Unreasonable persistent regrets over
social contacts ➔ Excessive, problematic social anxiety.
There is psychological-level evidence for the existence
and operation of every one of these causal links. In fact
such evidence led to the development of this model. It is
an evidence-based model of a CPP, which in turn directly
implies therapy choice. It is treatment-relevant, not by
way of indicating which pill, or even which monolithic
12-session therapy package, can ‘cure’ the ‘Excessive,
problematic social anxiety’, but by suggesting a specific
Cognitive Therapy intervention to address the distorted
self-evaluation of social performance – to break the
PMC at that point.
The proposed new taxonomy of CPPs is therefore
theory-based, treatment-relevant, evidence-informed,
and pragmatic. Much research required for its develop-
ment has already been undertaken. It is now a matter of
framing the results (e.g. the evidence-based models of
psychopathology) in PMC terms, extracting the smallest
simplest units (PMCs) and listing them under generally-
useful clinical categories of presenting problem. This
task deserves an effort corresponding to some meaning-
ful fraction of that which has been devoted to DSM’s de-
velopment, promotion, and dissemination.
The independence and standing of the discipline and
profession may then be restored, and, more importantly,
the millions of people experiencing crippling CPPs may
be offered more therapeutically relevant, less stigmatis-
ing, more empowering, more evidence-based, and more
comprehensible, reliable, and systematic formulations of
their problems.
Many uncertainties will remain despite such a clarify-
ing taxonomy. Disagreements will continue as to
whether a particular problem is best regarded as a Type
I, Type II, or Type III psychological problem. This has
long been a conceptual issue (What is a ‘mental dis-
order’?), a research-informed therapeutic issue (e.g.
counselling versus CBT versus pharmacotherapy), and a
territorial/political issue among the professions. A PMC
taxonomy can at least clarify the conceptual issues, and
guide research to address the therapeutic issues.
Appendix A
Many who promote a theory-based taxonomy or classifi-
cation of clinical psychological problems (CPPs) insist that
it must be based on ‘etiology’ of the problem, as this can
best indicate appropriate subsequent treatment (e.g. [31]).
This seems to be based on the culturally-entrenched
community-wide assumption that to properly ‘cure a dis-
ease’ we must find its ‘cause’ and reverse or root this out.
Anything else is just amelioration or symptomatic treat-
ment, and will not last. The disease will remain, to recur.
But the concept of a ‘cause’ in this context is often in-
discriminately cited to mean two very different entities.
It can refer to a precipitant - an historical etiological fac-
tor - such as an early loss or recent trauma. Or it can
refer to a current explanatory underlying mechanism or
process, such as an anxiety response maintained by avoi-
dant behaviour and catastrophic thinking.
Numerous examples can be found in the literature
where the ambiguity of the term ‘etiology’ has caused
conceptual, theoretical, and hence clinical confusions
(e.g. [14, 31, 325]). Some discussions give onset and
maintenance equal weight (e.g. [35]). The transdiagnos-
tic movement has been concerned with both distal risk
factors and with proximal within-person processes [105].
But only the latter of these can provide a treatment-
relevant taxonomy. It is not logical or useful to consider
any consequence of a traumatic event to be a CPP, while
no problem that arises without an identifiable historical
cause can be a CPP.
Therefore, the critical ‘causes’ or ‘etiologies’ are current
maintaining underlying mechanisms. They are what will
determine treatment.
This is true even within the medical model. For ex-
ample, fever and weakness can be ‘caused’ by an infec-
tion (the underlying process). Aspirin will not ‘cure’ this,
but an antibiotic might. We need to know the type of
bacteria to determine the treatment. We do not need to
know the source of the infection to treat it. This know-
ledge can be very useful for other reasons – to avoid re-
infection, for public health reasons, or to check for sus-
ceptibilities in the patient. But for ‘cure’, the ‘cause’ we
need to know about is the underlying mechanism, the
type of bacteria.
The same is even more true in clinical psychology.
This has been found empirically. None of the frontline,
evidence-supported, best practice, psychological-level
therapies listed in outcome meta-analyses require histor-
ical cures. Controlled studies do not support the efficacy
of rebirthing techniques, hypnotic regression, classical
psychoanalysis, traumatic incident reduction, psycho-
drama, catharsis, or abreaction [134, 326–328].
DSM has been criticized for being atheoretical with re-
gard to the “etiology” of its listed disorders (e.g. [31]). On
the other hand, the functional analytic approach of behav-
ioural clinical psychology has been criticized for emphasis-
ing current underlying mechanisms rather than historical
causes or precipitants. It was accused by psychodynamic
theorists of providing only ‘symptomatic’ or surface ex-
planation and treatment [329]. However, the symptom
substitution debates of the 1970s were resolved firmly in
favour of the ‘symptomatic’ treatments [330, 331], perhaps
because these treatments were not applied to ‘symptoms’
at all (a medical model term) but actually to the important
current underlying maintaining mechanisms behind CPPs.
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Even when problem onset has been examined, many or
most phobias, for example, do not arise from a distinct
traumatic conditioning experience [332–335]. It is often
unclear where they arise, but it can be clear what is main-
taining them. Avoidance is a common maintainer.
Hence, case formulations in CBT, while they may in-
clude inputs such as characterological tendencies, histor-
ical experiences, attachment issues, and precipitating
events, predominantly formulate explanations of the
maintenance of a presenting problem [54, 202, 336].
Similarly, transdiagnostic treatment protocols particu-
larly target “common maintaining factors” [117].
Appendix B
Based on the preceding evidence and arguments, and on
the clinical experience of the use of Bakker’s [219–221]
tentative taxonomy, it is proposed
(a.) That clinical psychological problem codes be
prefixed with ‘PMC’ standing for Problem-
Maintaining Circle.
(b.)That three levels of numerical coding be used, in
the format “PMC x.y.z”. More would be
unmanageable. Less would excessively limit the
amount of case formulation/functional analytic/
treatment implication information conveyed.
(c.) That the numerical ‘x’ codes represent generally
recognised, intuitively acceptable presenting
problem categories. An example of a start to such a
listing is given in Table 3. Included are only those
categories addressed in Bakker [218, 220].
(d.) ‘y’ codes represent the major classes of problematic
underlying mechanism (PMC element) that have
been identified in CBT models of psychopathology
and in transdiagnostic research, and that commonly
occur in one or (often) more types of presenting
problem. A preliminary listing is provided in Table 4.
As earlier described, the potential list of problem-
maintenance mechanisms is enormous. Table 4 only lists
some of the most researched, frequently recognised, or
treatment-triggering ones. This abundance is the reason
that ‘underlying mechanism’ or ‘treatment implication’ is
not coded at ‘x’.
(e.) To describe a problem as being maintained “by
avoidance”, or “due to reinforcement” is too broad
to implicate specific treatment approaches.
Therefore, it is proposed that ‘z’ codes represent
more specific evidence-based mechanisms under
each mechanism type. An example listing is pro-
vided in Table 5.
(f.) Type III psychological problems
(‘psychopathological’ problems) are those problems
that are not fully explained by psychological-level
PMCs, and are rarely fully ‘cured’ by interventions
that disrupt them. However, PMCs are frequently
involved, and psychological therapies can often help
management, reduce symptomatology, or avoid epi-
sodes of relapse. For some such problems, this is
currently the best form of therapy available. Table 6
lists some of the conditions currently considered to
be Type III (psychopathological) problems.
‘z’ codes in PMC 12.y.z problems (Table 6) would spe-
cify various evidence-based PMCs known to occur in
some cases of the disorder, which exacerbate symptom-
atology, and suggest psychological-level therapies that
have been shown to ameliorate, if not resolve, the condi-
tion, such as family therapy with schizophrenia or Social
Rhythm Therapy [337] for Bipolar Disorder.
(g.) ‘PMC 13.y.z’ codes represent PMCs which have
been found to occur between traditionally-
distinguished clinical psychological problems, sug-
gesting that, if detected, treatment targeting PMCs
within either or both problems may be indicated.











11.y.z Any Psychological Problem
12.y.z Type III Psychological Problems
13.y.z Interactive Clinical Psychological Problems
14.y.z
Table 4 Some proposed ‘y’ codes in a ‘PMC x.y.z’ taxonomy
x.1.z Avoidance (implying exposure therapy)
x.2.z Erroneous Cognitions (implying psychoeducation, cognitive
restructuring, thought stopping, self-talk coaching, etc.)
x.3.z Selective Attention/Hypervigilance/Preoccupation (implying
attentional control training, thought stopping, etc.)
x.4.z Sleep Disturbance
x.5.z Problematic Reinforcement
x.6.z Narrowed Coping Repertoire
x.7.z
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Table 7 lists examples of these, along with support-
ive research evidence for their existence. Comorbid-
ity is then not a diagnostic problem. It is a
naturally-occurring, informative, and explainable
risk, that broadens treatment options.
The interactive problems listed in Table 7 do not rep-
resent separately diagnosed mental disorders in the
DSM sense. They represent clusters or fields within the
symptom matrix of the network model [27]. Hence the
labels are chosen for their clinical utility only. For
example, ‘Anxiety’ includes PTSD, Social Phobia, etc. And
‘Sleep Disorder’ could be elevated to the status of a separ-
ate comorbid presenting problem, or remain a part of the
network field incorporated in ‘Depression’, ‘Anxiety’, etc.
Much is omitted, and probably critically misrepre-
sented, in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Correction of these
errors is exactly what will indicate consensus evidence-
based advancement of the scientific framework of clin-
ical psychology.
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